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The Case for a Market in
Debt Governance
Yesha Yadav*
Scholars have long lamented that the growth of modern finance has
given way to a decline in debt governance. According to current theory, the
expansive use of derivatives that enable lenders to trade away the default risk
of their loans has made these lenders uninterested, even reckless, when it
comes to exercising creditor discipline. In contrast to current theory, this
Article argues that such derivatives can prove a positive and powerful
influence in debt governance. Theory has overlooked those who sell credit
protection to lenders and assume default risk on the borrower. These
protection sellers are left holding the economic risk of a loan without any legal
control rights to safeguard their exposure. This Article demonstrates that the
interests of lenders and protection sellers are not necessarily adversarial,as
theory conventionally assumes. Rather, each side has considerable incentive to
cooperate as a way to reduce its own costs of participatingin the debt market
and to preserve reputationalcapital.
Recognizing this potential for cooperation, this Article proposes a
market for creditor control as a cure to the crisis in debt governance. Such a
market would allow lenders and protection sellers to trade control rights in
debt to ensure that they are held by those with real economic skin in the game.
This market aims to offer a fix to an otherwise difficult and costly problem: the
misalignment seen in modern markets between those who bear the economic
risk in debt and those best able to control it.
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I. INTRODUCTION

According to conventional wisdom, lenders have left corporate
America in crisis.' Scholars are increasingly recognizing the powerful
1. In the literature, the seminal work here has been undertaken by Professors Henry T.C.
Hu and Bernard C. Black. The "empty creditor" account proposed by Professors Hu and Black,
studied and well-established in law as well as in the finance literature, is analyzed in depth infra
Part IV.A. Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance
and Systemic Risk Implications, 14 EuR. FIN. MGMT. 663, 680-82 (2008) [hereinafter Hu &
Black, Debt Decoupling]; Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and
Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 728-35 (2008) [hereinafter
Hu & Black, Empty Voting Il]; Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the
Decoupling of Economic and Voting Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable)
Ownership, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 343 (2007) [hereinafter Hu & Black, Hedge Fund Insiders]; see also

Patrick Bolton & Martin Oehmke, Credit Default Swaps and the Empty Creditor Problem, 24
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role lenderS2 can play in corporate life. 3 But despite its importance,
lender influence is growing weaker.4 The consequences are costly for
all concerned: reckless lenders exercise poor oversight, borrowers are
forced towards liquidation in great numbers, and economic value is
destroyed through an inefficient allocation of credit.5 The blame,
current theory suggests, must be laid firmly at the door of credit
derivatives 6 like credit default swaps ("CDSs"). 7 These instruments
allow lenders to trade away the economic risk of a loan or a bond
without affecting the legal contract between the borrower and lender.8
REV. FIN. STUD. 2617, 2617-24 (2011) (introducing a finance-theory viewpoint modeling the
operation of the empty creditor problem from a formal financial model); Andras Danis, Do Empty
Creditors Matter? Evidence from Distressed Exchange Offers 3, 36 (Dec. 2, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://perma.ccl78AD-XMYJ (reporting that participation by creditors
in distressed debt exchanges declines by twenty-nine percent where a firm has CDS traded on its
debt); Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of Chapter 11, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J.
405, 423-27 (2007) (discussing the incentives of lenders using credit derivatives in

restructurings); Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private
Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115, 167-69 (2009) (discussing how credit
default swaps may encourage creditors to vote against the best interests of their debtors).
2.
When referring to 'lenders," this Article means both investors in bonds as well as those
who extend bank loans to a borrower. Similarly, "borrowers" can refer to both bank debtors as
well as bond issuers.
3.
See generally Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, PrivateDebt and the Missing
Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209 (2006) (examining the role of creditors in
corporate governance decisions); George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in
Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1073 (1995) (arguing that debtholders can
signal their perception of a company's creditworthiness by exiting their credit relationship);
Tung, supra note 1 (arguing that private debtholders can gain influence on the board of directors
through covenants in the loan documentation, contingencies, and conditions stipulated by
lenders).
4.
See, e.g., Marti G. Subrahmanyam et al., Does the Tail Wag the Dog? The Effect of
Credit Default Swaps on Credit Risk 24-39 (Feb. 16, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://perma.cc/63WY-TF8H (an empirical study of 901 firms with CDS trading on their debt
to show these are more susceptible to default or a decline in credit quality attributable, authors
suggest, to poor lender monitoring).
5.
There are numerous reported cases where lenders behave in a manner that shows
perverse incentives vis-A-vis their debtors. For further detail, see discussion infra Part IV.B.
6.
In addition to credit default swaps, other examples of credit derivatives include total
return swap, credit-linked notes, and credit spread options. While separate, these instruments
allow traders to engineer their credit exposures by trading credit risk to a third party. See JP
MORGAN & RISKMETRICS GROUP, THE JP MORGAN GUIDE TO CREDIT DERIVATIVES 7-30 (1999),
available at http://perma.cc/9BXN-YY45 (providing a detailed description of various kinds of
credit derivatives).
7.
See generally Hu & Black, Debt Decoupling,supra note 1 (exploring the financial risks
posed by separating the rights usually associated with debt from the debtholders via credit
derivatives); Hu & Black, Empty Voting II, supra note 1 (describing risks of the decoupling of
share ownership rights that credit derivatives create and examining parallels in debt markets);
Hu & Black, Hedge Fund Insiders, supra note 1 (describing the mechanics and potential
consequences of equity decoupling). These accounts are discussed infra Part IV.A.

8.

See, e.g., Rend M. Stulz, CreditDefault Swaps and the Credit Crisis, 24 J. ECON. PERSP.

73, 73-74 (2008) (discussing key features of the CDS markets, their social benefits as well as

774

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:3:771

CDSs can leave lenders with weak incentives to exercise sound
judgment and diligent discipline over the loans they extend. On this
view, financial innovation is killing good governance.
This Article argues that, rather than dooming governance to
failure, credit derivatives can motivate good behavior in the
borrower-lender relationship. In critiquing current theory, this Article
proposes a new perspective contesting the notion that debt
governance 9 necessarily suffers in the face of credit derivatives. It
shows that lender incentives, when properly harnessed, can work to
optimize debt governance, helping improve the allocation of credit to
the real economy.
Interestingly, the stated demise of debt governance comes at a
time when its importance is gaining recognition in law and policy.
Recent scholarship has shifted away from shareholder-centric
accounts of corporate governance. Scholars increasingly highlight the
powerful role that creditors now play as the "missing lever" in
corporate governance. 10 Professors Baird and Rasmussen, for instance,
point out that lenders can influence all aspects of corporate life,
including decisions as to personnel, a company's investments, and

costs); Rend M. Stulz, Demystifying FinancialDerivatives, MILKEN INST. REV., Sept. 2005, at 20,
20-31 [hereinafter Stulz, Demystifying] (providing an overview of derivative markets, including
their benefits to lenders); Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex
Markets, 101 GEO. L.J. 387, 395-415 (2013) (critically examining the regulation of credit
derivatives in the Dodd-Frank Act). See generally Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The
Promises and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019 (2007) (examining the key
characteristics of credit derivatives, their uses, and the possible risks that their use creates, for
example, the potential to foster reckless extension of credit); Lynn A. Stout, The Legal Origin of
the 2008 Financial Crisis (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ. Research Paper No. 11-05, 2011),
available at http://perma.cc/RK2N-99L3 (noting that the deregulated over-the-counter ("OTC")
derivatives markets were one of the key causes leading up to the 2008 Financial Crisis). Under
the Dodd-Frank Act, credit default swaps are excluded from the definition of "insurance
contract." Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 767(a)(4), 124 Stat. 1376, 1800 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)(4)). For an
insightful perspective on the problems with the tendency to refer to credit derivatives as
insurance, see M. Todd Henderson, Credit DerivativesAre Not "Insurance,"16 CONN. INS. L.J. 1,
22-55 (2009), which argues that credit derivatives should not be regulated as insurance. See also
Robert F. Schwartz, Risk Distributionin the Capital Markets: Credit Default Swaps, Insurance
and a Theory of Demarcation, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 167, 181-89 (2007) (providing
useful context on the debates as to whether or not CDS should be conceptualized and regulated
as insurance contracts).
9.
Hu & Black, Debt Decoupling, supra note 1, at 665-67 (defining debt governance as
"the interactions between creditors and firms (or other debtors), such as negotiations to address
loan terms and conditions").
10. See generally Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 3 (arguing that creditors play a
significant role in major decisions made by troubled corporations).
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business strategies. Crucially, this engagement can come at all stages
of a borrower's life, not just when a borrower finds itself in distress.'1
Beyond simply ensuring repayment on their debt, these
interventions can prove lucrative for lenders. Lenders gain access to
the inner workings of management, cementing client relationships
and assuring future business.12 For example, small breaches in the
loan contract 3 can prompt renegotiations in the lender's favor.14 The
market has also witnessed a series of so-called loan-to-own deals,
allowing lenders to transform their debt into an equity stake and to
profit when a company makes a return to form.15
That credit derivatives might diminish lender enthusiasm for
governance is unsurprising. CDSs allow lenders to shift the credit risk
of a loan from the lender's books to those of another firm without
requiring the lender to sell the loan outright. Under the CDS, a lender
pays a protection seller a regular premium-much like an insurance
premium-to protect the lender against the risk of the borrower
defaulting.' 6 If the borrower defaults, the protection seller must make
the lender whole. The CDS thus achieves an important innovation: it
separates the economic risk of a loan, which shifts to the protection
seller, from the legal rights attached to the loan, which remain with

11. Id. at 1212.
12. See generally Tung, supra note 1 (noting that lenders often have inner access to
company boards and are equipped with high granularity of information).
13. The tools available to lenders are vast, as discussed in this Article. They can include
legal rights to monitor a debtor, to stipulate conditions as to how it uses secured assets, and to
discipline management.
14. See sources cited infra note 37 (exploring the extent of creditors' potential control over
borrower corporations).
15. Loan-to-own strategies involve lenders making loans to struggling companies and
subsequently using their rights as creditors to transform their debt into an equity stake. See,
e.g., Michelle Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt Investing: An Empirical Study of Investors'
Objectives, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69, 84-87 (2008) [hereinafter Harner, Trends in
Distressed Debt Investing] (empirically showing that specialist activist investors are well
capitalized and often successful in their interventions, engaging in opportunist purchase of debt
to exercise governance rights, for example, extending financing to facilitate acquisition of an
ownership stake in the company); Michelle Harner, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy
Implications of DistressedDebt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 725-27 (2008) [hereinafter
Harner, Implications of DistressedDebt Investing] (detailing the Kmart case, where hedge funds
engaged in debtholder activism to push for ownership and control).
16. Ordinarily, the Lender pays the Firm a fee for this arrangement. The Firm has come to
be popularly perceived as a type of insurer. The Lender pays the Firm a regular premium. If the
Lender suffers a loss, the Firm agrees to make the Lender whole for the loss that it suffers. The
amount of the fee is usually expressed as a percentage of the notional amount of the debt
obligation. See generally Henderson, supra note 8 (showing the risks of characterizing CDS as
insurance).
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the lender.17 With no economic risk, a lender becomes an "empty
creditor" with limited incentives to monitor and discipline its
borrower. In fact, the lender might be motivated to push its borrower
into liquidation and trigger repayment under the CDS, cheaply exiting
the investment.18
This Article makes several contributions. First, it shows that
conventional theories of debt governance hew to a narrow definition of
"lender." In the established account, scholars focus on the incentives of
a company's lenders of record-in other words, those who extend a
loan to a company and enjoy the benefit of debt governance through
the loan contract. Remarkably, scholarship entirely overlooks the role
played by those who sell credit protection to lenders and assume the
risk of a loan. These protection sellers suffer from a key deficit: though
they assume economic risk on an underlying loan, they enjoy none of
the benefits of debt governance. These "economic lenders" cannot rely
on the loan contract to monitor and discipline a misbehaving
borrower. Protection sellers, then, should have powerful incentives to
seek out and engage in debt governance to protect their investment.
Harnessing these incentives can co-opt players with actual skin in the
game to become engaged in credit risk management.
Second, lenders and protection sellers have strong incentives to
cooperate in matters of debt governance. At first blush, the interests of
lenders who buy protection appear to be entirely in opposition to those
of protection sellers: protection buyers are repaid under the CDS upon
default, while protection sellers must pay out on default. Whereas
protection buyers can benefit when borrowers engage in risky conduct,
protection sellers must internalize the costs of poor lender discipline.
But looking deeper, it becomes clear that lenders and protection
sellers enjoy a more complex relationship than first meets the eye.
This Article demonstrates that lenders and protection sellers
have incentives that are cooperative as much as adversarial.
Importantly, lenders do not necessarily wish to see their borrowers
fail. A bad loan book damages a lender's reputation. It also invites

17. These mechanics are slightly more complicated than described here. This is discussed
in greater detail infra Part III.A.
18. See Hu & Black, Debt Decoupling, supra note 1, at 681-84 (explaining this incentive
structure and considering possible examples in the market); Hu & Black, Empty Voting II, supra
note 1, at 728-34 (describing the mechanics of debt decoupling and the incentives it creates for
creditors, including negative economic ownership). See generally Danis,supra note 1 (concluding,
based on an empirical examination, that CDSs change bondholder incentives in a way that
makes it more difficult for troubled firms to restructure debt).
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public sanction and scrutiny for mismanagement and recklessness.19
These consequences should motivate lenders to share governance
responsibilities with protection sellers. Cooperation can reduce the
costs that lenders face. It can also help shift the costs of oversight to
actors that hold economic risk in debt and are driven to exercise
robust supervision.
The concentrated and specialized nature of the CDS market
reinforces this potential for cooperation. The CDS market is
dominated by Wall Street's largest and most sophisticated outfits,
including banks, investment banks, mutual funds, hedge funds, and
insurers.20 CDS traders routinely buy and sell credit protection from
and to each other. And most institutions both buy and sell credit
protection as part of their business. In other words, Bank A might buy
protection from Firm F one day, and on another occasion, Firm F
might buy credit protection from Bank A. At the same time, the
market broadly divides between those that are net buyers of credit
protection and those that specialize as net sellers. Whereas banks
tend to buy protection on a net basis, others, such as pension funds,
mutual funds, and insurers, have emerged as net protection sellers in
the market. 21 These dynamics point to a market that depends heavily
on mutual reliance between its players for continued trading in credit
protection. It also suggests that a niche group of protection sellers can
end up holding enormous risks on underlying borrowers without any
legal control rights to protect themselves.
These interconnections offer pathways to foster cooperation
between CDS traders in matters of debt governance. Protection buyers
and sellers should wish to maintain good relations with each other.

19. See Lubben, supra note 1, at 425 ("[L]enders may ... have an incentive to separate
lending and hedging operations in order to protect their reputations."); Subrahmanyam et al.,
supra note 4, at 10-11 (describing the potential impact on a bank's reputation in that bank's
relationship with a borrower firm).
20. See KATHRYN CHEN ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REP. No. 517, AN
ANALYSIS OF CDS TRANSACTIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC REPORTING 5-8 (2011). Trading

activity in CDS markets is focused on a small market of approximately 50-100 market
participants trading daily in single-name CDS and around 135 trading daily in indices of CDS.
Id. More than half (approximately sixty percent) of all activity was undertaken by the largest
G14 dealers. Id.; see also Jesse Eisinger, Swap Market Like LIBOR Is Vulnerable to
Manipulation, http://perma.ccIV7ST-Z73M (dealbook.nytimes.com, archived Feb. 5, 2014)
(discussing the small number of key banks involved in the CDS market and in the private
regulation of the CDS market through the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
("ISDA")).
21. As discussed in this Article, certain actors like banks and hedge funds are net buyers of
credit protection, even though they sell protection as part of their business. Mutual funds and
insurers are generally specialist net sellers of credit protection. See sources cited infra note 111
(discussing protection sellers).
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These friendly relations can reduce the costs of credit protection to the
point where parties can place greater trust in one another's behavior.
Significantly, cooperative instincts between market players can help
to improve outcomes in Main Street debt governance. Where CDS
traders are able to cooperate with one another, they can work together
to shift the costs and opportunities of debt governance to those who
need them-in particular, to those firms with large net exposures on
underlying borrowers. In short, CDS traders can help themselves by
helping each other. From a game-theoretic perspective, the market
works like a classic assurance game: 22 parties can optimize their
private gains when they cooperate with one another. 23
Building on this argument, this Article proposes the creation of
a new market for corporate debt governance as a cure to the problem
of "empty creditors" in corporate America. This market would harness
cooperative incentives and allow lenders and protection sellers to
trade their debt governance rights with one another. In so doing, the
market would help ensure that these rights come to be used by those
who need them and can utilize them most effectively.
The market in debt governance centers on trades in creditor
control rights. These rights typically give lenders considerable control
over a borrower's affairs. Through the loan agreement, lenders are
able to exercise control rights to maintain a borrower's continuing
creditworthiness and to preserve its enterprise value. For example,
loan covenants allow lenders to monitor a debtor, to demand
information, and to limit a range of borrower activities. These
agreements can also restrict borrowers from disposing of certain
assets, incurring additional debt, declaring dividends, or making large
capital expenditures. Borrowers must pay taxes, comply with any

22. The assurance game, also known as the "Stag Hunt," refers to a game in which
members of a group achieve a greater prize through cooperation. While members of the group
can individually achieve a smaller prize (a rabbit) by pursuing their own interests, the Paretooptimal strategy is for the members of the group to cooperate in order to collectively achieve a
larger prize (the stag). As later described in this Article, where lenders and protection sellers
cooperate in the management of the underlying debtor, they can achieve gains for all parties,
including the debtor. This cooperation reduces costs for lenders, by reducing default rates,
ensuring that protection sellers can manage their risks and debtors face more careful oversight
of the debt they assume. In the meantime, of course, lenders and protection sellers may be
distracted by smaller gains, for example, by becoming empty disruptive creditors that might
yield a short-term gain at the expense of better credit management overall. For a discussion of
these principles, see Eric A. Posner et al., Divide and Conquer 4-5 (Harvard Pub. Law Working
Paper No. 09-24, 2009), availableat http://perma.cc/5T6T-2MQX.
23. See discussion infra Part IV.C (discussing the mutual desire to keep costs low by
cooperating).
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applicable regulatory requirements, and maintain insurance and other
permissions.24
Lenders can lose motivation to exercise these control rights
once they purchase credit protection. However, these same lenders
may be unwilling to see loans fall into outright default. 25 At the same
time, protection sellers harbor strong motivations both to monitor and
discipline borrowers, and to control credit risk. 26 A market for debt
governance would bring lenders and protection sellers together to
"trade" rights in debt governance. In this market, lenders and
protection sellers could agree with each other on how a protection
seller might monitor, discipline, and intervene in the affairs of a
debtor company. In acquiring the ability to engage in debt governance,
credit protection sellers would be able to make use of rights that might
otherwise fall into disuse in the hands of reckless or lazy lenders. To
curb abuse, protection sellers would also become subject to the usual
duties and accountability constraints applicable to lenders in their
exercise of creditor control.
Surprisingly, policymakers have not meaningfully addressed
the costs of poor debt governance arising from the use of derivatives.27
Post-Great Recession reforms have focused on reducing the impact of
derivatives on the financial system-not on Main Street corporate
governance. 28 This Article seeks to offer a cure to the debt governance
24. See sources cited infra note 37 (examining creditors' control mechanisms over borrower
entities).
25. As discussed earlier, lenders risk suffering a variety of negative consequences, such as
loss of reputation, higher costs of obtaining credit protection as well as public sanctions on
account of having a distressed loan book. For a detailed discussion, see infra Part IV.B.
26. Described in greater detail in this Article, credit protection sellers can face enormous
credit risks in selling protection to lenders. Firms can purchase CDS protection on debt that they
do not necessarily hold on their books. This means firms can purchase "naked" swaps, meaning
swaps where they do not actually hold the loans or bonds on which the credit protection is
written. The amount of credit protection can often vastly exceed the actual debt outstanding.
This means that the credit protection seller can become subject to extensive liability. The ability
to acquire control rights in debt to manage the debtor more actively can yield great gains and
help the protection seller manage the large liability. By engaging in active debt governance,
protection sellers can ensure that a debtor company benefits from better debt discipline. The key
example here is that of Delphi Corporation, a car company. When Delphi went into bankruptcy
in 2005, it had approximately $25 billion in CDS outstanding against around $5 billion in actual
bond and loan debt. For more detail explaining of the reallocation of risk to protection sellers in

the CDS, see Satyajit Das, The Credit Default Swap ("CDS") Market-Will It Unravel?,
http://perma.cclU35K-S2TA (wilmott.com, archived Feb. 5, 2014) (explaining the reallocation of
risk to protection sellers in the CDS market).
27. In informal bankruptcy process, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 2019 makes room for great
disclosure of lenders' economic interests. However, the reach of this provision is limited. For
discussion, see source cited infra note 174 and accompanying text.
28. See sources cited infra note 98 & 102 (discussing regulation of the derivatives market
via private means).
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problem and the costs that it creates. This proposal's guiding rationale
is simple. It seeks to ensure greater alignment between economic risk
in debt and legal control rights that manage this risk. By closing the
nexus between economic risk and its legal safeguards, a market in
debt governance helps to empower those best incentivized to exercise
debt governance to actually do so. More broadly, this market
challenges conventional definitions of "lenders" and "credit providers"
to reflect the realities of a complex market. Identifying "real" economic
lenders enables the law to hold these actors accountable. Invariably,
these insights have far-reaching implications for common-law lenderliability regimes, as well as for bankruptcy law.
A market in debt governance might appear radical at first.
However, trade in control rights has long been a part of the equity
markets. For example, firms have long been able to enter into
corporate-vote-lending arrangements to briefly acquire the legal rights
in share ownership without also burdening themselves with the risk.
The expansive use of equity derivatives, such as equity swaps, to
disentangle the legal benefits of share ownership (e.g., voting rights)
from their economic risk is also well-known. 29 This ability to
selectively acquire control rights indicates the enormous economic
advantages presented by a market able to commoditize control rights
for trade between interested parties.
Finally, one might question why such a market does not
already exist, particularly if the incentives of market actors are
primed towards cooperating on matters of debt governance. A possible
response to this query is that such a market might, in fact, already
operate in some form. It is certainly possible that CDS market
participants might be bilaterally agreeing with one another behind the
scenes as to how lenders should behave vis-A-vis the debtor. But there
are numerous legal constraints that presently prevent such a market
from flourishing and market participants from openly admitting to
cooperating on debt governance. For example, such bilateral
discussions might raise concerns that lenders are breaching their
confidentiality undertakings towards the borrower. They might
insinuate that participants are involved in some form of insider
dealing in a borrower's securities, or colluding in breach of antitrust
rules. Moreover, the CDS industry presently lacks documentary
mechanisms to facilitate trades in control rights alongside credit risk,
29. See generally Hu & Black, Empty Voting II, supra note 1 (describing the phenomenon of
equity decoupling, where traders seek to specifically acquire control rights in equity to influence
key corporate decisions). For a fuller discussion of this phenomenon, see Part I.C.
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making it harder and costlier for parties to negotiate with one
another.
A market in debt governance would formalize such dealings,
removing legal and regulatory constraints. Most importantly, it would
ensure that CDS traders negotiate and transact in the open, in the full
light of a formal market rather than bilaterally on an ad hoc basis.
Clearly, this Article is only the first step in the larger project of
designing and developing a market in debt governance. It seeks to
start the conversation-to offer a way forward in solving a serious
dilemma facing both Main Street and Wall Street: how to ensure that
parties can allocate credit risk efficiently, without also compromising
the levers of debt governance that help control this risk in the market.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II analyzes the emerging
role of debt governance as a force in modern corporate life. It examines
the importance of creditor control for lenders as a risk management
tool and as a means of garnering revenue and influence for lenders.
The variety of control rights and their ability to be used in a tailored,
nuanced manner ensures that debt governance has come to be prized
by lenders.
Part III introduces credit derivatives and their key legal and
economic features. CDSs separate the economic risk in debt from the
legal control rights traditionally used by lenders to manage this
exposure. Part III analyzes current theory on the incentives of "empty
creditors," who have purchased CDS protection on their debt. It is well
established that lenders without skin in the game possess limited
motivation to behave responsibly vis-A-vis a debtor, creating
challenges to restructuring and sending companies needlessly into
bankruptcy.
Part IV presents a new theory of governance to show that CDS
traders have incentives to aim for sounder outcomes in governance.
Contesting current theory, this Part demonstrates that the interests of
lenders and protection sellers can fall in alignment towards better
debt governance. It highlights the role of reputation in CDS markets
to outline the potential for cost sharing and cooperation between
lenders and protection sellers.
Part V proposes a new model for a market in debt governance.
It sets out the rationales for and necessary mechanics of this market.
In ensuring that protection sellers can acquire levers of control in
debt, a market in debt governance closes the gap between economic
risk and legal control rights in debt, in the interests of sounder credit
allocation through the economy. Part VI concludes.
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II. A NEW DEBATE
Scholars have long debated the question of who holds the levers
of power within a corporation. Ever since Berle and Means's insight
into the separation of a company's ownership from its locus of
control, 30 scholarship has yielded a vast literature into the significance
of this disconnect. It is a long-cherished principle of corporate law that
directors run a company as caretakers for shareholders. 31
Shareholders are widely viewed as the indisputable owners of the
company, providers of its long-term capital, and the engine of control
driving essential decisionmaking. 32 However, times are changing.
Increasingly, scholars are recognizing the powerful role of lenders in
corporate decisionmaking. This Part begins by examining this shift to
recognize the impact of debt governance. It also analyzes traditional
common-law constraints on corporate control that regulate creditor
activism in corporate governance.
A. Creditorsand CorporateControl
Scholarship has traditionally regarded shareholders as the key
unit of control in corporate governance, with directors as agents to
manage their capital. Shareholders have the power to elect directors,
to approve important corporate decisions, and to change the company's
constitution. 33 In return, directors owe fiduciary duties to the company

30. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 1-126 (1932).
31. See Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People's Money, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1309, 1309-10 (2008) (discussing the tendency in judicial decisionmaking and scholarship to
assume that directors owe fiduciary duties exclusively to shareholders); see also Margaret M.
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 248 &
n.1 (1999) (reiterating the shareholder-as-owner principle and tracing its development in
economics to various articles).
32. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 98 (Del. 2007)
("It is well established that the directors owe their fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its
shareholders."); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAw 91-92 (1991); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:

ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 312-30 (1976)
(discussing the agency costs that arise where managers are responsible for managing
shareholder capital for the firm). See generally LOUIs BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND
How BANKERS USE IT (1914) (discussing the role of directors of banking corporations).
33. Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV.
1151, 1182 (2010). See generally Richard Squire, Strategic Liability in the Corporate Group, 78 U.
CHI. L. REV. 605 (2011) (arguing that shareholders exhibit correlation risk, increasing their
levels of leverage to maximize returns through this leverage, but knowing they will not bear the
costs of this risk-taking).
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and to its shareholderS34 as a promise to safeguard against
mismanagement and misuse of their equity capital. 35
Increasingly, however, scholars argue that this singular focus
on shareholders as the decisive actors in corporate control is
incomplete. Looking through a wider lens, some academics propose
focusing on the role of creditors in corporate governance. 36 This
influence, they claim, can be more intense than shareholder
monitoring, because informed lenders can exercise tight control
through strict, narrowly defined covenants. 37 While this Article does
not purport to enter into the long-standing debate on the effectiveness

34. See Koehler v. Black River Falls Iron Co., 67 U.S. 715, 720-21 (1862) ("[Directors] hold
a place of trust, and . .. are obliged to execute it with fidelity ... for the common benefit of the
stockholders of the corporation."); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 32, at 91-92 (describing
why directors hold fiduciary duties and how they keep director behavior in check); Henry T.C.
Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the CorporateDuty to Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
1321, 1331-40 (2008) (arguing that directors owe their fiduciary duties to equity holders until
the onset of bankruptcy).

35.

See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate

Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 580-82 (2003) (discussing the risks directors may take with
shareholders' equity and the incentive structures that prevent them from doing so); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 837-39 (2005)
(proposing that shareholders have the power to initiate changes in corporate governance as a
means of rectifying director mismanagement); Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for

CorporateLaw: A NeotraditionalInterpretationof FiduciaryDuty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 217-18
(1999) (explaining that investors may be diversified, and be shareholders in one company but
debtholders in others, thereby able to balance their gains and losses, nullifying the concept that
fiduciary duties are tied to maximizing shareholder gains). But see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, supra note 31, at 251-55 (describing how, under the team production model of the firm,
directors' duties exist not to protect shareholders exclusively but to encourage investment in the
firm by all of its constituencies); Alon Chaver & Jesse M. Fried, Managers' FiduciaryDuty upon

the Firm's Insolvency: Accounting for Performance Creditors, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1813, 1831-35
(2002) (discussing the role of "performance creditors," creditors who are owed performance under
a contract, rather than money, and that they be considered in any analysis of fiduciary duties).
36. See generally Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 3 (focusing on the importance of creditor
control in corporate governance).
37. See Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in
Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 537-39 (2009) (suggesting that creditors exert
considerable control over the affairs of a debtor before and during bankruptcy); Douglas G. Baird
& Robert Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 777-88 (2002) (discussing
creditor control rights in the twilight before bankruptcy); Greg Nini et al., Creditor Control
Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value 10-30 (Dec. 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://perma.cc/E4VS-HRV3 (empirical discussion of the influence of creditors
following violations of financial covenants). See generally Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 3
(discussing the impact of creditors on corporate governance decisions in and out of bankruptcy);
Triantis & Daniels, supra note 3 (arguing that debtholders can signal their perception of a
company's creditworthiness by exiting their credit relationship); Tung, supra note 1 (arguing
that private debt holders can gain influence on the board of directors, through covenants in the
loan documentation, contingencies, and conditions stipulated by lenders).
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of shareholder scrutiny, the emergence of lenders as a key unit in
corporate governance is difficult to dispute.38
The power exercised by lenders can be expansive 39-and highly
visible, backed by detailed information on a company. 40 On the advice
of lenders, underperforming but well-regarded CEOs may be
summarily removed, 41 management practices transformed, and capital
structure changes undertaken. This is all to ensure the continuation of
the borrower's creditworthiness and the future of the lending
relationship. As a last resort, lenders retain the ability to place a
borrower in insolvency, a nuclear option to motivate good behavior
from management.
The loan contract gives lenders access to an array of precise
tools that limit the latitude managers have in how they deploy a firm's
cash flows and other assets. 42 As Professor Jensen notes, such
restrictions constrain the ability of managers to usurp cash flows or
misuse assets for private gain: managers must repay lenders and
provision accordingly. 43 This check on agency risks limits the debtor
company's abilities to invest in high-risk projects, ensuring that
lenders are repaid. Of course, such "underinvestment" might also
result in companies missing out on risky, albeit lucrative, projects.
But the aim is straightforward: to assure repayment, at a minimum.
Loan contracts contain detailed covenants that allow lenders to
extract information from borrowers, restrict their borrowing, prevent
disbursement of cash to shareholders through dividends, and protect
collateral values. Borrowers may be asked to refrain from making
capital expenditures, issuing additional debt, or from engaging in

38. Baird & Rasmussen, supranote 3, at 1209-12 (arguing for the increasing recognition of
lender influence in corporate governance).
39. This power depends on whether it is actually used. Professors Triantis and Choi discuss
that when credit is plentiful, loan contracts can be light in their covenants, or these may never
be enforced. See George G. Triantis & Albert Choi, Market Conditions and Contract Design:
Variations in Debt Covenants and Collateral, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 52, 61 (2013) (questioning why
lenders adjust covenants instead of changing interest rates).
40. Tung, supra note 1, at 130-40.
41.
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 1209-10 (citing the case of the CEO of Krispy
Kreme Donuts, who, though long-serving and popular, was removed after the company ran into
trouble by failing to deliver accounts as required by loan covenants). For an excellent recent
account of creditor control and intercreditor conflict, see Mark J. Roe & Federico Cenzi Venezze,

A Capital Market, Corporate Law Approach to Creditor Conduct, MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 8-16), available at http://perma.cclH7GU-Z725.

42.

Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, CorporateFinance,and Takeovers,

76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 324-26 (1986) (noting that debt covenants control managerial use of free
cash flows).
43. Triantis & Daniels, supranote 3, at 1078-79.

2014]1

A MARKET IN DEBT GOVERNANCE

785

changes to their corporate structure without lender permission.
Lenders also expect borrowers to show full compliance with applicable
laws, regulations, and permissions. 44 While such contract terms vary
depending on a debtor's risk profile, most debt contracts also include a
set of key tried-and-tested boilerplates. These allow lenders to monitor
notification
information
demands and
borrowers
through
requirements. They also assure lenders that their investments cannot
be devalued through further borrowing, changes of control, or an
unexpected change in the order of priority among creditors. 45 Given
these evident benefits, it is understandable that lenders covet creditor
control mechanisms.
Access to a borrower's corporate apparatus also represents a
powerful source of financial gain for lenders. In addition to providing
credit, financial firms offer an array of services to their clients, from
management advice to underwriting services. Such expertise usually
comes with a hefty price tag.4 6 More lucratively, lenders can convert
their debt investment into equity ownership, potentially generating
enormous upsides through so-called loan-to-own strategies. These
have predominated in recent years via cheap investments in
distressed debt, which later transform into profitable stakes in secondchance success stories. 47 Historically, while banks are limited by
regulation in their ability to invest in commercial corporations, 48
investment firms, hedge funds, private equity, and other capital
providers have greater freedom in this regard. 49
Bank debt. Loan covenants are tightly drafted. Unsurprisingly,
failure to comply is common, even expected, irrespective of how

44. Nini et al., supra note 37, at 6-10.
45. Triantis & Choi, supra note 39, at 106-09.
46. See Tung, supra note 1, at 140 (noting the pressure that borrowers face from lenders
that provide a variety of important financial and advisory services).
47. Kmart's Chapter 11 proceedings were a case in point. There, ESL Investments and
Third Avenue Trust, two important hedge funds, became the largest two creditors of Kmart by
purchasing its pre-petition and bankruptcy debt. They were able to use their debtholder rights to
make significant decisions on Kmart's management, business, and reorganization plans to
emerge as dominant equity holders in the restructuring. See Harner, Implications of Distressed
Debt Investing, supra note 15, at 725-27 (noting that, while Kmart still has challenging issues
ahead, its immediate postbankruptcy performance increased its stock value).

48.

See Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and

Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 281-92 (2013) (discussing in detail the regulatory
restrictions facing banks in their investments in commercial companies, their history, rationales,
and impact).

49.

See Harner, Implications of Distressed Debt Investing, supra note 15 (providing a

detailed review of recent cases of debt-based takeovers and the implications for regulation).
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creditworthy a borrower may be.50 Mostly, such legal "trip-wires"51
offer an opportunity for borrowers and lenders to renegotiate loan
terms, allowing lenders to make suggestions regarding the borrower's
management, governance, and capital allocation arrangements.52
Scholars report that violations of financial covenants are often
followed by sharp falls in capital expenditures, acquisitions, sell-offs of
plant and property, shareholder payouts, and changes in company
management.5 3 Sometimes negotiation can relax the stringency of loan
terms.5 4 In addition to hard power, lenders also exercise soft influence.
For example, lenders can suggest changes to management, product
lines, the appointment of turnaround specialists, or perhaps, likely
suitors or takeover targets.55
Bondholders. Scholars have generally focused their attention
on bank lenders in framing the governance discussion. Bondholders,
by contrast, present a problem: they are usually too dispersed to exert
any control over corporate debtors. However, scholars note that
insights regarding creditor control also apply vis-a-vis bondholders,
albeit with nuances. Scholars argue that the intensity of bondholder
intervention is multifaceted-and indeed faces notable challenges.
First, bond investors are often widely dispersed and cannot easily
communicate with one another. This creates collective action
challenges, coordination difficulties, and differences in incentives
50. Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Control Rights and Capital Structure:An Empirical
Investigation, 4 J. FIN. 1657, 1660 (2009) (showing that only about four percent of defaults
resulted in the termination of a lending relationship by the lender, and arguing that default is a
gateway to further negotiation, rather than termination).
51. George G. Triantis, Debt Financing,CorporateDecision Making, and Security Design,
26 CAN. Bus. L.J. 93, 101-02 (1996) (discussing how lenders influence governance by acting when
covenants are breached).
52. Nini et al., supra note 37, at 2-3 (reporting that, in any given year, almost ten to
twenty percent of creditors report a violation of their financial covenants); Raghuram Rajan &
Andrew Winton, Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor, 50 J. FIN. 1113, 1113-16
(1995) (discussing the capacity of covenants to incentivize monitoring).
53. Nini et al., supranote 37, at 3 (noting, for example, that in their dataset CEO turnover
was sixty percent higher in the quarter of a covenant violation).
54. Charles Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, the Credit Market, and
Corporate Governance, 34 J. CORP. L. 641, 650-54 (2009) (discussing that the strength of
covenants is determined by a variety of factors, including agency costs and the riskiness of
borrower); see also Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate
Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 67 (1982) (noting that agency costs arise from risk alteration by a
manager-shareholder due to the fixed debt obligations).
55. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 1212-13 (arguing that lenders have multiple
options to avoid hurting business value); Triantis, supra note 51, at 101-02 (discussing how
lenders influence debtor governance); George G. Triantis, The Interplay Between Liquidationand
Reorganization in Bankruptcy: The Role of Screens, Gatekeepers, and Guillotines, 16 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 101, 102-05 (1996) (explaining how private lenders control managers).
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between various bondholders, which can paralyze action. 56 Second,
though bondholders in the public markets benefit from an indenture
trustee57 under the Trust Indenture Act, scholars agree that the
trustee's ability and volition to act is patchy at best and completely
ineffective at worst.58 Third, bondholder covenants vary in the wiggle
room they allow borrowers, with the general consensus being that
bank covenants tend to be narrower, better monitored, and better
enforced. Bank lenders are usually much smaller in number and are
able to both coordinate with one another and benefit from a larger
bundle of rights in the loan agreement.59
While they may not enjoy the same intensity of control vis-A-vis
an issuer, bondholders still retain power to affect governance and
impact the organizational apparatus of a borrower. This is especially
true for private placements. These private issues of bond debt are
often undertaken by issuers who are more risky. 60 Private placements
usually carry larger denominations and end up being held by a small
number of repeat, specialist players like hedge funds. 61 Private
placement debt can carry tougher covenants, negotiated between a
smaller group of investors and the issuer.62 Such covenants are
usually designed as negative clauses that limit a borrower's freedom
to act. For example, such restrictions can include limitations on the
ability of a company to borrow more money, sell key assets, acquire
new businesses, or declare dividends that divert wealth away from
bondholders.63 Taken together, private placement bond debt can
facilitate the exercise of creditor control.
56. See Yakov Amihud et al., A New Governance Structurefor CorporateBonds, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 447, 469-70 (1999) (proposing the creation of a supertrustee to overcome the coordination
and collective action challenges).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(a)(1) (2012). An indenture trustee is important in bond issues to
perform key administrative duties on behalf of the investors, to ensure that interest payments
are made, as well as to ensure that all investors receive key information with respect to the
issue. For discussion, see Steven L. Schwarcz & Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Defaults and the
Dilemma of the Indenture Trustee, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1037, 1038-43 (2008) (explaining the role and
purpose of the indenture trustee).
58. Amihud et al., supranote 56, at 473.
59. Id. at 457-62.
60. William Bratton, Bond Covenants and Creditor Protection:Economics and Law, Theory
and Practice,Substance and Process 25-28 (Georgetown L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 902910,
2006) (arguing that, while protection is incomplete for bondholders, the number and quality of
covenants varies by the risk of the borrower).
61. Amihud et al., supranote 56, at 458.
62. Bratton, supranote 60, at 18-19.
63. Bondholders may use such transactions as leverage to extract concessions from the
issuer. In the case of Jean Coutu Group's sale of Rite Aid, a group of bondholders (comprising
hedge funds mainly) insisted that the bondholder covenants prohibited the issuer from
undertaking the sale, as the sale represented "substantially all" of the assets of the issuer. In
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Bondholder governance remains a clear force, even if it may not
in all cases be as strong and coordinated as bank debt. A small
number of debtholders can be effective in their ability to monitor
borrowers, approve waivers, and propose amendments. Professors
Kahan and Tuckman argue that bondholders can often coordinate well
to deal with an issuer of securities. 64 Critically, the impact of
interventions made by these private bondholders helps shareholders
and other investors. Public investors are deeply affected by the
existence of restrictions in privately held debt or bank debt. 65 Where
these restrictions exist, they affect the company as a whole. Public
investors can thus free ride off the monitoring capacity provided by
holders of private debt. 66 The emergence of sophisticated investors,
such as hedge funds, vulture funds,'67 and asset management
companies, has increased this intensity of bondholder scrutiny and
enforcement. Professors Rock and Kahan acknowledge that hedge
funds in particular have raised the bar in bondholder vigilance and
enforcement of contract terms that may once have gone unnoticed.68
B. Constraintson Creditor Control
The common law has long recognized that lenders can be held
liable where their interventions exhibit an unduly high intensity of
holding out and delaying the sale, bondholders were able to obtain early repayment on the bonds
in return for providing their consent. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 1-2, 5-6, Jean
Coutu Group (PJC) Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 06-CV-14301 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2006) (No. 1),
2006 WL 4069805.
64. Marcel Kahan & Bruce Tuckman, Do Bondholders Lose from Junk Bond Covenant
Changes?, 66 J. BUS. 499, 500-01 (1993); Marcel Kahan & Bruce Tuckman, Private vs. Public
Lending: Evidence from Covenants 11-13 (UCLA Anderson Grad. Sch. Mgmt., Paper No. 13-93,
1993) (contrasting the relative ability of private debt agreements to influence management
versus public debt covenants).
65. Tougher covenants may not always be beneficial for the borrower. For example, tight
restrictions in the way a borrower runs his or her business can hamper its ability. The loan
document thus seeks to arrive at an optimal balance, or at least, at an optimally intense exercise
of monitoring authority.
66. See Bratton, supra note 60, at 10-13, for an insightful discussion.
67. A feature of vulture fund action manifests in buying up distressed bonds at a discount
then using bondholder rights to enforce terms, for example, to demand full payment on the debt
or to block efforts to restructure debt, where restructuring might require consent of all
bondholders. For a discussion on the costs of opportunistic holdout investors in sovereign
restructuring, see William Bratton & Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of
Creditors,57 VAND. L. REV. 1, 21-23 (2004).
68. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Fund Activism in the Enforcement of
Bondholder Rights, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 281, 284-92 (2009) (examining the greater vigilance
exercised by bondholders in corporate governance, as seen in the more active enforcement of
indenture covenants).

2014]1

A MARKET IN DEBT GOVERNANCE

789

control. The law can-and has-imposed fiduciary responsibilities on
lenders, through such devices as the law of agency, alter ego, or the
doctrine of instrumentality. 69 Lenders that exercise an overly
intensive level of control can be deemed as principals and the debtor
as agent.70 In such cases, the lender can become subject to general
duties of fairness and due diligence with respect to the debtor, its
directors, and its other creditors. Yet, as Professors Triantis and
Daniels note, courts are usually reluctant to find such liability.
Moreover, lenders are careful to package their interventions as soft
suggestions rather than hard edicts to avoid legal scrutiny.71
Bankruptcy laws work to recoup value lost through
opportunistic and reckless conduct by debtors and lenders alike.
Voidable preference rules and limits on transactions at undervalue
constitute a way for a debtor's estate to retrieve value. 72 These actions
constitute a formal means to return value to a debtor's estate once a
debtor is in or otherwise nearing bankruptcy. Notwithstanding its
importance, the reach of the insolvency process can perhaps appear
remote to a lender, especially where a debtor company is in sound
financial health. Thus, the immediate effectiveness of such rules to
limit everyday lender conduct may be weak.
Although the impact of legal constraints may be patchy,
lenders also face private discipline from one another. Where a
company takes out loans from multiple creditors, each has some
incentive to ensure that the overall investment remains viable. Take
for instance the age-old conflict between senior-secured creditorsand
those junior to them in priority. Junior creditors face the possibility of
seeing their investment devalued through the actions of secured
creditors. Secured creditors, whose interests lie in ensuring the
continuing value of their collateral, can act in ways that lower the
value of the estate while preserving or enlarging the value of the

69. Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. Nat'l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1105 (5th Cir.
1973) (determining that liability under the alter ego or instrumentality doctrine requires a more
intense level of control than between agent and principal).
70. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 291 (Minn. 1981) (holding that
control by Cargill was sufficiently intense to establish a principal-agent relationship between the
lender and the debtor); Adelphia Commc'ns Corp. v. Bank of Am., 365 B.R. 24, 63 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2007) (reasoning that a lender's ability to force the borrower undertake certain
transactions created fiduciary duties for the lender).
71. Triantis & Daniels, supra note 3, at 1100-02; see also Capmark Fin. Grp. Inc., v.
Goldman Sachs Credit Partners L.P., 491 B.R. 335, 344-46 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (determining
Goldman did not constitute an "insider" because there was no indication of "extensive control").
72. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2012).
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security. 73 This can happen, for example, when a secured creditor
monitors only the secured asset rather than the estate as a whole. 74
Here, junior lenders must pick up the slack to ensure better discipline
for the debtor's entire estate.
Lenders routinely share the responsibilities of oversight to
maximize the relative expertise and interest of each lender. This is
most clearly exemplified by loan syndications: where a group of
lenders share the risk and monitoring responsibilities relating to a
large loan. Professor Triantis notes the gains of such "cooperative
monitoring" between creditors. Cooperative monitoring can work to
optimize the effectiveness of monitoring when creditors harness their
specialist advantages in supervising a debtor. One creditor, for
instance, may be best placed to oversee a debtor's plants and
machinery, whereas another may have deeper knowledge of a debtor's
securities holdings. Such divisions of labor are especially valuable
when lenders are specialists in one or other area and privy to differing
pools of information on a debtor's business.75 To prevent defection
from the collective monitoring agreement, creditors must monitor each
other to assure performance and to fill in the gaps. Such monitoring
might not be perfect. Strategic pressures and transaction costs can
make optimal monitoring impossible, and lenders may defect from
time to time.76 Nevertheless, cooperative monitoring agreements
illustrate the significance of debt governance for all creditors. These
agreements underscore the role of cooperation in intercreditor
relationships to overcome agency costs created where a single
powerful lender can extract private rents at the expense of the
debtor's estate.
To summarize, debt governance represents a potent-and
undertheorized-force in corporate governance today. While not
perfect, and constrained by laws to limit lender interference, the
exercise of creditor discipline constitutes an important tool to help
lenders protect the risks they assume. The growth of credit derivatives
has had a dramatic impact on corporate life, as CDSs have shown

73. Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 37, at 537-40 (discussing conflicts in creditor control in
Chapter 11); Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors' Bargain and Option-PreservationPriority in
Chapter 11, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 761-62 (2011) (analyzing the conflicting incentives of juniorversus senior-secured creditors in restructuring).
74. George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 225, 240-43 (1992) (noting that creditors can face differing monitoring pressures).
75. Id. at 241-43.
76. Id.
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themselves capable of reshaping the borrower-lender relationship and
the effectiveness of this risk-management mechanism.
III. THE ECONOMICS OF CREDIT DERIVATIVES

This Part describes the key features of credit derivatives and
their core economic functions."7 While CDSs radically reshape the
borrower-lender relationship, current literature has largely focused,
somewhat narrowly, on the ways CDSs function in the financial
markets. Despite the profound impact of CDSs on corporate lending,
scholarship and policy has been surprisingly silent about fully
analyzing the interaction between the CDS market and everyday
corporate governance.
A. Key Features and Market Design
1. What Is a Credit Derivative?
A derivative is a contract that "derives" its value from an
underlying reference entity, benchmark, or asset.78 Credit derivatives
are financial contracts whose value is linked to a change in the credit
quality of an underlying reference asset or entity.79 A typical CDS
trade can be illustrated as follows. If the Lender extends a loan to the
Company and no longer wishes to hold the credit risk of this debt on
its books, it can off-load this risk to the Firm using a credit derivative.
Legally, ownership of the loan does not change hands, and the
Company may be completely unaware of this transaction.
The trade relates only to the economic risk of this loan. The
Lender and the Firm enter into a CDS that shifts the economic risk of

77. See, e.g., Anurag Joshi, Reserve Bank of India Introduces Credit Default Swaps: Limits
Market Scope, http://perma.ccfU6J6-NM77(bloomberg.com, archived Feb. 5, 2014) (summarizing
the basic function of credit default swaps while reporting that India introduced credit default
swaps to its market). See generally Subrahmanyam et al., supra note 4 (providing an empirical
study of 901 firms with CDS trading on their debt to show these are more susceptible to default
or a decline in credit quality, attributable, authors suggest, to poor lender monitoring).
78. See, e.g., Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1019 (defining derivatives and summarizing
the role derivatives play in financial markets); Stulz, Demystifying, supra note 8, at 20-31
(describing, in detail, financial derivatives). The assets that derivatives may reference are
considerable, and can include commodities such as wheat, sugar, cocoa, or oil, as well as such
benchmarks as inflation, or even the weather. For insightful discussion on credit default swap
features see generally, Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default
Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167 (2011).
79. Product Descriptions and Frequently Asked Questions, http://perma.cc/QY9A.2APW
(isda.org, archived Feb. 5, 2014). For other examples of credit derivatives, see JP MORGAN &
RISKMETRIcs GROUP, supranote 6, at 7-30, and Partnoy & Skeel, supranote 8, at 1019.
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the loan from the Lender to the Firm.80 The Firm agrees to protect the
Lender in the event that the Company defaults. To compensate the
Firm for holding the risk associated with the Company's default, the
Lender pays the Firm a regular and -periodic fee. The amount of the
fee varies depending on the Company's perceived risk of default.8 '
Conversely, protection providers like the Firm must demonstrate to
protection buyers that they can provide the protection they promise.
Lenders typically demand collateral from protection sellers to reflect
the risk presented by the Company, the underlying reference entity.
Like the periodic fees the Lender provides the Firm, the amount and
quality of this collateral varies depending on how risky the contract
becomes through its term. 82
This CDS transaction can achieve several objectives. First,
from the Lender's perspective, the CDS helps the lender shift the risk
of the Company's loan off its books. The loan may be expensive if the
lender must provision for the loan by setting aside some capital, which
would generate opportunity costs if the lender wishes to invest this
capital elsewhere. Or, the Lender may wish to diversify its portfolio of
loans-for example, if it has overinvested in a particular sector or
corporate type (such as start-ups). In this case, the Lender may be
worried about the credit risk posed by the Company and wishes to
protect itself from this risk materializing.
Second, from the Firm's perspective, the CDS ensures a regular
payment from the Lender for protection. This income stream can be
profitable if the Company is not considered risky. Importantly, the
Firm gets "synthetic" exposure to the Company without having to
actually make a loan, buy the Company's bonds, transact with the

80. For critical perspectives on referencing credit derivatives as insurance, see Henderson,
supra note 8. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, credit default swaps are excluded from the definition of
"insurance contract." Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 767(a)(4), 124 Stat. 1376, 1800 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)(4)). See
also Schwartz, supra note 8, at 181-88 (providing context on debates as to whether CDS should
be conceptualized as insurance).
81. This periodic fee is usually expressed as a fraction of the notional value of the asset.
82. For example, AIG, a key protection provider for CDS for the financial markets, rapidly
collapsed when it faced continuous collateral calls as the mortgage-backed securities it was
protecting grew toxic through 2007-2008. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

INQUIRY REPORT 243-45 (2011); see also William Cohan, How Goldman Killed AIG,
http://perma.cc/J4P3-Z3BS (nytimes.com, archived Feb. 5, 2014). Cohan argues that Goldman
Sachs placed AIG's in peril by issuing a $1.61 billion dollar collateral call in 2007 on the CDS
that AIG had written to protect Goldman Sachs. Id. This collateral call was issued in 2007,
prompting others-for example, Merrill Lynch-to issue their own calls. Id. The value of this call
was subsequently reduced to $450 million, but then it was followed by another $2.8 billion
collateral call in late 2007. Id.
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Company, or invest in building a relationship with the Company. This
arrangement allows the Firm to obtain exposure to a company,
industry, or corporate type relatively inexpensively. 8 3 Similarly, if the
Firm agrees to protect the Lender against default on a pool of bonds,
the Firm benefits from its exposure to these securities without a high
capital outlay (in other words, without having to actually pay for the
bonds). The Firm should believe that the Company is unlikely to
default. Or it wishes to get higher fees for covering the Company's risk
when it becomes a shaky prospect. 84
Like any market for securities, CDS trading is facilitated by
market intermediaries that help connect protection buyers with
protection sellers. "Dealers" facilitate trading by matching trading
parties as well as keeping the market liquid by purchasing credit
protection themselves when a trading party is unavailable or for their
own hedging purposes. By making a market for CDSs, dealers can
help ensure that prices remain stable to prevent sudden spikes and
crashes with fluctuating demand for credit protection.85
2. Rationales for Using Credit Derivatives
These rationales illustrate the three functionalities of credit
derivatives: (i) hedging, (ii) speculation, and (iii) information
extraction. First, credit derivatives provide a means for lenders to
reduce the risks on their books without selling an asset outright.86
This happens when firms can sell off part or all of the economic risk on
a loan but retain the legal rights that they have vis-A-vis an
underlying entity.87 Hedging allows firms to maintain their existing
relationships with clients, tailor their exposure to these clients, and
participate in the credit market while still knowing that their
exposures can be synthetically engineered to suit their investment
inclinations. Hedging also allows firms to price the costs of credit ex

83. As explained in this Article, it can be cheaper for protection sellers to take on the risk
of a loan using a CDS rather than buying an underlying security outright. When buying a loan or
a bond, the protection seller must expend the full capital cost of the investment. When taking on
the risk of the underlying Company using a CDS, the protection seller can take on the exposure
(and the income that comes with it) without buying the underlying security.
84. See HAL SCoTT & ANNA GELPERN, FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY AND REGULATION
890-95 (18th ed. 2011) (providing a descriptive overview).
85. Marco Avellaneda & Rama Cont, Transparency in Credit Default Swap Markets 9-10
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://perma.ccIW25Y-7JYA (describing the role of
dealers in CDS markets).
86. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1021-22 (showing that bank protection holders were
able to avoid billions in losses owing to clever use of CDS).
87. Id. at 1023.
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ante, to provision for this participation (e.g., by retaining sufficient
capital), and to reduce the externalities generated for the market.88 In
theory, by ensuring that risks are held by those best able to
internalize their costs, credit derivatives can be seen as promoting a
more efficient allocation of capital and a reduction in market-wide
systemic risks.
Second, the speculative nature of credit derivatives-and the
deleterious impact that speculation can have-has generated
considerable debate in the wake of the Financial Crisis. 89 A key driver
in the debate is that credit derivatives allow traders to take a position
on assets when neither party owns the underlying asset. 90 Firms take
a bet to reflect their view of the Company's future creditworthiness. A
financial firm might purchase credit protection on debt issued by the
Company because it believes that the Company is likely to default.
The transaction here is purely speculative: the Company's debt
constitutes a reference for the CDS contract, rather than a real
interest held by a credit protection buyer. Moreover, the Company's
lenders might buy more credit protection than the value of the debt
that they hold. Such extra protection ensures that lenders benefit in
the event that the Company defaults, over and above the value of the
debt on their books. From the perspective of the protection seller,
those who take on the risk of the Company defaulting usually do so
where they believe the Company is likely to survive. They wish to
avoid paying out wherever they can. The ability of market participants
to accumulate "naked," or speculative, exposures has sometimes
resulted in CDS exposures on the Company's debt that are far in
88. Firms that cannot fully hedge their risks may find themselves carrying loans that their
balance sheet cannot sustain. For example, a bank or investment firm may overinvest in a
particular sector or region. When this happens and it must hold the risk on its books, its balance
sheet becomes overly dependent on these loans performing. Where such loans fail and create
conditions for the failure of the lender, this can generates risk for the financial system where a
firm's collapse impacts other financial firms in the system. Such hedging can allow lenders to
skirt potentially disastrous defaults on their loan books. See id. at 1023-26 (noting the role of
CDS as "shock absorbers" for lenders.).
89. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 8, at 5-9 (noting that speculation in unregulated derivatives
contributed to the development of leverage underlying the Crisis); see also Lynn Stout et al.,
Regulate OTC Derivatives by Deregulating Them 30 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ. Research
Paper No. 09-22, 2009) (stating that excessive speculation in the field of credit default swaps
leads to economic ills). In an early Article, Professor Stout noted that speculative derivatives had
the potential to lead to bubbles. Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and

Private Orderingin the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 753-62 (1999).
90. Erik F. Gerding, Credit Derivatives, Leverage, and Financial Regulation's Missing
Macroeconomic Dimension, 8 BERKELEY. Bus. L.J. 29, 37-38 (2011) (noting that "pure bet"
derivatives can be used to take a position on an asset where the buying party does not hold any
economic risk).

2014]

A MARKET IN DEBT GOVERNANCE

795

excess of the actual debt outstanding.91 There are further complicating
factors. Notably, protection sellers, too, can purchase credit protection
on the CDS protection they have agreed to provide. In other words,
protection sellers can shift the credit risk of the Company's debt to yet
another protection seller. In such cases, the original protection seller
becomes a protection buyer in the market. Daisy chains of credit
derivatives, with protection sellers at various stages buying protection
on their own exposures through CDSs, are now infamous for adding
webs of complexity to the market-and for making it impossible to
determine where the risks came to rest.92 Speculative traders make
finding a trading party easier for those who wish to hedge an actual
risk. At the same time, the provision of greater liquidity to the market
comes with societal and macroeconomic implications, resulting in
increasing risk through the financial system. 93
Third, credit derivatives transmit information on underlying
securities and entities. They indicate the market's perception of the
risk posed by an underlying asset. This perceived risk is reflected in
the price at which protection buyers are able to purchase the swap,
with higher prices (or "spreads") indicating that the transaction
entails risks for the protection seller. Increasingly filling the vacuum
left by credit rating agencies, CDS spreads have become important
methods of forecasting the default risk of an underlying asset.
Scholars argue that CDS spreads can often be more accurate than
traditional mechanisms of predicting default and market risks. 94 In
91. In the case of Delphi Corporation, the amount of CDS outstanding on Delphi's debt was
almost five times more than the amount of the outstanding underlying debt. See Das, supra note
26 (discussing Delphi Corp, where Delphi ended up subject to $28 billion worth of CDS
outstanding against $5.2 billion worth of its bonds and loans when it entered bankruptcy).
92. Gerding, supranote 90, at 38-40.
93. Margaret M. Blair & Erik F. Gerding, Sometimes Too Great a Notional: Measuring the

"Systemic Significance" of OTC Credit Derivatives, 1 LOMBARD STREET 10, 12-14 (2009),
available at http://perma.cc/57U-2SJ4. One way in which traders can hedge their bets, or
indicate their negative view of the market is through short selling. However, a short sale of
bonds, for example, requires a trader to eventually return the bonds subject to the short sale.
This can be problematic in a market that is not very liquid. Studies have shown that the market
for corporate bonds, especially those that are investment grade (i.e., rated higher than BBB) can
be illiquid. See Jack Bao et al., Liquidity of Corporate Bonds 19-22 (July 9, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://perma.cc/4DN-68EA (demonstrating that a bond's illiquidity
decreases with its rating); see also Ekkehart Boehmer & Julie Wu, Short Selling and the Price
available at
manuscript),
2012) (unpublished
2
(July 16,
Discovery
Process
http://perma.cc/NED5-EM2Z (arguing that there is greater information efficiencies when short
sellers are more active).
94. Thomas Daula, Do Credit Default Swaps Improve Forecasts of Real Economic Activity?
2-3 (Apr. 18, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://perma.cc/5Q5C-R6NZ (arguing
that the CDS market provides an important indicator to forecast economic risk affecting the real
economy, and may provide a more accurate way to model such risk than Treasuries); Mark J.

Flannery et al., Credit Default Swap Spreads as Viable Substitutes for Credit Ratings, 158 U. PA.
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the run-up to the Crisis, CDS indices came to the fore as early
warning mechanisms of the coming decline in the housing market,95
even when credit rating agencieS96 signaled that the market remained
robust and on an upward trajectory.97
Despite the benefits offered by CDSs, there are reasons for
caution. In analyzing the risks posed by the CDS market,
policymakers have focused on the impact of CDSs on the financial
system. 98 In other words, little attention has been given to the role of
CDS markets on corporate Main Street governance. Generally
speaking, reform has addressed the opacity of CDS markets, their ad
hoc reporting mechanisms,99 and the risk-mitigation mechanics 00
governing their trading.101 These reforms represent significant
L. REv. 2085, 2086-90 (2010) (noting that CDS spreads incorporate information far quicker than
credit ratings).
95. See, e.g., Gary B. Gorton, The Subprime Panic 1-2 (Yale ICF Working Paper No. 08-25,
2008), available at http://perma.cc/J7YP-ZDVZ (arguing that the ABX indices, reflecting baskets
of CDS, provided an early indicator of the downturn in the housing market).
96. See, e.g., Howell Jackson, The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Establishment of
Capital Standards for Financial Institutions in a Global Economy 5-11 (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://perma.cc/335V-RZUY (discussing the reliance on credit rating
agencies in the Basel Capital Accords for calculating how much capital banks are required to
keep).
97. See, e.g., John Patrick Hunt, Credit RatingAgencies and the Worldwide Credit Crisis':
The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement, 2009
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 109, 113-14 (noting the poor performance of rating agencies despite their
reputation in the market).
98. Derivatives traders have come to rely heavily on industry-standard master agreements
that express general consensus on definitions, industry conventions, and risk-mitigation
mechanisms (e.g., close-out netting). These master agreements have reduced legal uncertainties
between parties and cut transaction costs. They can be modified by parties to suit the terms of
their deal. See Bushan Jomadar, The ISDA Master Agreement-The Rise and Fall of a Major
Financial Instrument 4-9 (Aug. 24, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://perma.c/44FD-U8U8 (discussing the standardization efforts generated by the widespread
use of the ISDA Master Agreement); Frank Partnoy, ISDA, NASD, CFMA, and SDNY: The Four
Horsemen of Derivatives Regulation? 6-10 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper, Paper No. 39, 2001), available at http://perma.cc/7RZF-DZ2R (discussing
the private regulation of the derivatives market through ISDA).

99.

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,

§ 723, 124 Stat. 1376, 1800 (2010) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2) (requiring that swaps be traded
on swap execution facilities and be subject to mandatory clearing).
100. Dodd-Frank Act

§§

731, 766(b). The Dodd-Frank Act mandates that CDS trading move,

as far as possible, to be traded on swap execution facilities (put simply, exchanges) and cleared
using clearinghouses. Clearinghouses match trades and ensure trade completion. By proceeding
through clearinghouses and exchanges, regulators seek to bring transparency and systemic
stability to CDS markets.
101. Robert P. Bartlett, III, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case Study of
Derivative Disclosures During the Financial Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 1, 3-4 (2010) (noting the
complexities of data relating to credit derivatives that impede the ability of the market to absorb
its implications). It should be noted that the Dodd-Frank Act mandates greater transparency for
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changes for CDS markets and the way its participants internalize and
pay for the risks they assume. 102 However, they do not explain or
address the costs that CDS markets create for borrowers that see CDS
trading on their debt.
B. DistributiveImpact of CDS Trading
CDSs trade extensively on the debt of single corporate entities.
Bank lenders and bondholders purchase CDS protection on the
corporate debt they take on. On the other side, CDS protection sellers
acquire "synthetic" exposure to the underlying company by assuming
the risk of this debt. Around two-thirds of CDS trading occurs on
CDSs that reference the debt of one underlying reference entity, such
as a sovereign or a corporate entity. Approximately fifty-seven percent
of all single-name CDS trades reference a corporate entity. 103
Buyers and sellers of credit protection generally comprise Wall
Street's largest financial firms.104 In addition to size and
sophistication, these firms provide credit to the financial system, both
to other financial firms as well as to companies, through direct loans
and purchases of bonds or commercial paper.105 This particular
composition of firms in the CDS market is no accident. By legislative
derivatives markets under Title VII through mandatory trade reporting. However, the fact of
reporting may not necessarily reduce informational deficits where this information remains
difficult to understand.
102. THE G-20 PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, LEADER'S STATEMENT 9 (2009), available at
http://perma.cclEW4G-GYLM (The G-20 consensus is reflected in Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act
that sets out a reform strategy for OTC derivatives. In the European Union, the European
Markets Infrastructure Regulation implements the G-20 consensus on derivatives reform.);
COMM. ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION,

THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL

CRISIS: A PLAN

FOR

REGULATORY REFORM 48 (2009), available at http://perma.cc/SDA3-562N; Michael Barr,
Professor, Univ. Mich. Law Sch., Speech to the Pew/NYU Stern Conference on Financial Reform:
Dodd-Frank Act, One Year On (July 21, 2011), available at http://perma.ccl85HS-EVP8
(discussing the role of OTC derivatives in increasing debt bubbles in the financial system). See
generally CHRIS BRUMMER, SoFrT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULEMAKING IN THE

21ST CENTURY (2012) (presenting an excellent and comprehensive analysis of the governance and
regulatory framework for global finance, its decisionmaking processes, and the key bodies
driving the reform agenda globally).
103. CHEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 7-8; CDS FAQ, http://perma.cclk223-keyq
(isdacdsmarketplace.com, archived Feb. 5, 2014).
104. CHEN ET AL., supranote 20, at 7.
105. Commercial paper means bonds that are of a short maturity (under one year, and often
shorter). They are used by companies of all sizes to maintain operations (e.g., to make payroll,
buy inventory etc.). Without purchases of commercial paper ongoing, companies can face a major
credit crunch. During the Crisis, the Fed set up the Commercial Paper Funding Facility to
incentivize investment in commercial paper. See Commercial Paper Funding Facility,
http://perma.cc/AA9P-87M8 (federalreserve.gov, archived Feb. 5, 2014) (explaining why the
Federal Reserve created the Commercial Paper Funding Facility).
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intent, only the most sophisticated financial firms have been
permitted to enter the over-the-counter ("OTC") trading space. 06
Significantly, the risks inhering in CDSs, as well as the complexities
in valuing them, 07 have reduced the number of firms institutionally
equipped to engage in this market. This is evidenced in part by the
fact that the number of CDS traded by nonfinancial firms is virtually
negligible.s08 The demand and supply for these instruments is
basically confined to a cohort of sophisticated financial firms. Beyond
their sizeable stature, however, there are a few other notable trends
among the institutions that comprise the CDS market.
Protection buyers. Research has uncovered that, on a net basis,
banks tend to buy protection on their exposures rather than sell it.
Banks have historically been the biggest users of CDSs. 09 This is not
surprising when one considers their role in originating credit to the
corporate and financial sector. Studies note that, while not all banks
use CDSs to hedge their exposures, the ones that do increase their use
of CDSs when they increase their lending to corporate and industrial
borrowers and to larger debtors." 0

106. Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554,
Stat. 2763 (2000) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2(h), 25(a)(4) (2012)).

§§

103, 120, 114

107. See Houman B. Shadab, Credit Risk Transfer Governance: The Good, the Bad, and the
Savvy, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1009, 1020-21 (2012) (discussing the unique nature of credit risk
and challenges in valuation); Charles Smithson & David Mengele, The Promise of Credit

Derivatives in Nonfinancial Corporations(and Why It's Failed to Materialize), 18 J. APPL. CORP.
FIN. 54, 55--56 (noting that corporates frequently use currency and interest rate derivatives but
show a low use of CDS); see also BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, SEMIANNUAL OTC DERIVATIVES
STATISTICS AT END-DECEMBER 2011 (2012), available at http://perma.cclE8LK-BXVU (showing
that nonfinancial institutions do not use credit derivatives, whereas they do use other types of
OTC derivatives such as interest rate swaps).
108. Smithson & Mengele, supra note 107, at 57-58 (noting that corporations were reluctant
to use CDS owing to uncertainties as to whether CDS can achieve the desired hedge and
challenges in how to provision for entering into the CDS).
109. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: CREDIT DERIVATIVES
AND MORTGAGE-RELATED CREDIT DERIVATIVES 4 (2010), available at http://perma.cc/8Q8S-FA92

(noting that commercial and investment banks composed the majority of CDS users); CRAIG
VARRELMAN & LEWIS TATTANNI, CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS: INTO THE MAINSTREAM, GE ASSET
MANAGEMENT WHITE PAPER (2005).
110. BEVERLY HIRTLE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT No. 318, CREDIT
DERIVATIVES AND BANK CREDIT SUPPLY 6-7 (2008) (noting that CDS were shown to increase

lending, particularly when loans were made to the commercial and industrial sector); Bernadette

A. Minton et al., How Much Do Banks Use Credit Derivativesto Reduce Risk? 4-5 (Fisher Coll. of
Bus., Working Paper No. 2006-03-001, 2006) (reporting that banks are net buyers of credit
protection and that CDS use correlates positively with banks with poorer capital reserves, equity
capital and net income); see also THE BRITISH BANKERS ASS'N, BBA CREDIT DERIVATIVES REPORT
17-18 (2006) (surveying market practitioners in the credit derivatives market through the use of
a detailed questionnaire).
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Protectionsellers. By contrast, the net sellers of credit
protection include insurers, pension funds, and more surprisingly,
mutual funds, alongside a collection of specialist broker-dealers.111
The involvement of insurance firms as protection sellers tallies with
their historic expertise in risk valuation (though as seen in the demise
of AIG, insurer participation has also generated a concentrated source
of risk). That pension and mutual funds are engaged in selling credit
protection to Wall Street's highest sophisticates is perhaps more
revelatory. 112
Hedge funds. The arrival of hedge funds to the market has
been transformative. From a modest start in 2001, when hedge funds
comprised approximately 3% of buyers and 5% of sellers of protection,
their participation grew to 28% of buyers and 32% of sellers at the
height of the credit bubble in 2006.113 Correspondingly, the hold of
commercial and investment banks on the market fell from 63% of
buyers and 81% of sellers in 2001 to 59% of buyers and 44% of sellers
in 2006.114 More recently, an important 2011 report notes that hedge
funds115 have (on a net basis) tended to buy protection. This might
suggest that, post-Crisis, they harbor a more negative view of the
future creditworthiness of underlying companies. 16 These shifting
111. BANK OF INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW 86 (Dec. 2011), available at
http://perma.cc/32JY-L2CB; see Lisa Pollack, Meet the Credit Derivative End Users,
http://perma.cc/6ZZA-2DR5 (ft.com, archived Feb. 5, 2014) (noting that it is logical that
broker-dealers are net protection sellers); Houman Shadab, Hedge Funds Transfer Risk to
DerivativesDealers, http://perma.cc/D3BQ-AZP3 (lawbitrage.typepad.com, archived Feb. 5, 2014)
(explaining that "CDS dealers on net bought protection from all other types of counterparties
except for hedge funds"). Where hedge funds are concerned, dealer firms tend to sell protection to
hedge funds, even though dealers tend to hold an overall protected position in the market.
112. For example, a recent study of the hundred largest corporate-bond mutual funds notes
the increased use of CDS by mutual funds. In particular, the study highlights that sixty percent
of these funds use CDS and are net sellers of CDS protection. Funds that underperform in the
first half of the year evidence a greater tendency to use CDS in the second half. Some mutual
funds were reported to hold CDS positions that were, in notional value, larger than the value of
their total net assets. See Tim Adam & Andre Guettler, The Use of Credit Default Swaps in Fund
Tournaments 25 (Aug. 16, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://perma.ccl6U5REY5F (comparing fund characteristics and CDS usage).
113. THE BRITISH BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 110, at 17-18.
114. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supranote 82, at 301.
115. Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, otherwise known as the Volcker Rule, prohibits
short-term proprietary trading for banks. This prohibition may impact the extent to which banks
engage in speculative credit derivative trading. While invariably important, this Rule is unlikely
to significantly diminish the attraction of CDS as strategic governance tools. Professor Charles
Whitehead argues that activities like CDS trading (especially protection selling) will likely end
up with investors such as hedge funds, permitted to engage in proprietary trades and relatively
less regulated than banks. Charles Whitehead, The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial
Markets, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 42 (2011).
116. BANK OFINT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 111, at 8.
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parameters of hedge funds in the CDS market suggest that hedge
funds use CDSs strategically to maximize gains in current market
conditions.
Moving beyond these trends, the allocation of risk between
market actors and institution type can be highly asymmetric. The
larger banks tend to operate as net protection buyers. But they do not
buy protection all the time, and in the earlier days of CDS trading,
banks dominated as protection sellers. However, as the market has
grown, a niche cohort of pension funds, insurers, mutual funds, and
some broker dealers has emerged to specialize in selling credit
protection. The asymmetry here creates the potential for an uneven
distribution of risk in the market, which concentrates risk in the
hands of a specialized group of actors. In broad strokes: a niche
number of pension and mutual funds, insurers, and a subset of
broker-dealers can hold enormous swathes of credit risk vis-A-vis the
rest of the market, and in particular, the federally insured banking
sector.117 Where markets are stressed, it becomes much harder for this
niche group of actors to sell or share this risk with others. Put
differently, the higher the chances of CDSs paying out, the lower the
likelihood that protection sellers can shift or share their own exposure
to other actors. They thus face a challenging proposition. Protection
sellers are left holding vast amounts of risk on underlying borrowers
without any legal tools to control the conduct of these debtors. Such an
imbalance spells danger not only for individual protection sellers but
also for the financial system as a whole, which depends on protection
sellers to manage credit risk.
117. This analysis is necessarily imperfect. In the absence of fulsome data on the CDS
market, the interpretations above are open to nuancing. For example, not all banks buy equal
levels of protection. Some frequent users may dominate by volume. A small number of banks
may be buying up a disproportionately large level of protection. Conversely, it is possible that
banks, when they sell protection, reference higher risk underlying debtors. Arguably, the ability
of banks (in particular) to access Federal Reserve discount windows and deposit insurance might
spur a search for risky yield. See Christine A. Parlour & Andrew Winton, Laying off Risk: Loan
Sales v Credit Default Swaps 4-5 (Apr. 23, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (suggesting that of
US bank holding companies with over $1 billion in assets, twenty-three used credit derivatives,
and these twenty-three accounted for approximately sixty percent of sample assets). As an
example of dealer banks referencing high risk underlying debt, see Yalman Onaran, Selling More
CDS on Europe Debt Raises Risk for U.S. Banks, http://perma.cc/TJR7-KL6N (bloomberg.com,
archived Feb. 5, 2014) (reporting that, in acting as protection sellers, the notional CDS exposure
for US banks rose from $80.7 billion to $518 billion on Italian, Greek, Spanish, Irish and
Portuguese government and corporate debt in the first half of 2011); see also Beverly Hirtle,
Credit Derivatives and Bank Credit Supply, 18 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 125 (2009) (using a
microdata set of individual corporate loans to explore whether use of credit derivatives is
associated with an increase in bank credit supply); Minton et al., supra note 110, at 2 (examining
the use of credit derivatives by US bank holding companies from 1999 to 2003).
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In summary, CDSs have emerged as a remarkable innovation
in modern financial markets, allowing firms to finely parse and share
the credit risks of lending to Main Street companies. CDSs generate
important benefits when they help lenders hedge their risks. But they
can also be dangerous when market actors cannot fully understand
and provision for the risks they assume. However, while the literature
and regulation has focused on the risks posed by CDSs for financial
stability, there has been little focus on the risks posed by the CDS's
ability to separate the economic risk in debt from the legal rights
traditionally used by lenders to control that risk.
IV. SEPARATING OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN DEBT

This Part challenges and reconceptualizes current theory
regarding the impact of credit derivatives on debt governance.118 CDSs
effect a separation between those who hold economic risk in debt and
those who possess the control rights to that risk. Akin to corporate
law's traditional separation of ownership and control, moral hazard
can arise when the lender holding control rights has no skin in the
game to exercise those rights in a diligent manner. However, this Part
offers a new perspective. It suggests that lenders and protection
sellers have powerful incentives to try to cure this moral hazard. This
Part lays the groundwork for a proposed market in debt governance.
This market seeks to overcome the costs that CDSs can extract from
companies through lender mismanagement and rent seeking. At the
same time, the market seeks to place control rights in the hands of
those who are best incentivized to exercise them effectively.
A. The Costs of Separation
Traditional theory argues that lenders who purchase credit
protection lose interest in exercising the levers of control available to
them through their loan or bond agreement. Professors Hu and Black,
in a series of leading articles, theorize that CDS trading diminishes
lender incentives to exercise control rights in debt. Moreover, CDS
trading motivates lenders to pursue inefficient outcomes as debtors
enter financial distress and insolvency. In short, traditional theory
118. See, e.g., Subrahmanyam et al., supra note 4, at 4 (an empirical study of 901 firms with
CDS trading on their debt to show these are more susceptible to default or a decline in credit
quality, attributable, authors suggest, to poor lender monitoring); Anurag Joshi, Reserve Bank of

India Introduces Credit-Default Swaps: Limits Market Scope, http://perma.cc/HN4C-FCP2
(bloomberg.com, archived Feb. 5, 2014) (detailing the Reserve Bank of India's introduction
of CDS).
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suggests the following: (i) lenders that protect themselves using CDSs
have limited interests in exercising debt governance vis-A-vis the
borrower; (ii) such lenders are likely to behave recklessly, increasing
the chances that a debtor falls into distress; and (iii) as debtors
approach distress, hedged lenders are likely to push borrowers
towards bankruptcy in order to recoup payment on the CDS and exit
their investment.119
Briefly stated, where lenders hold credit risk on their books,
they are motivated to exercise their control rights in debt to ensure
that the borrower remains creditworthy. By exercising these control
rights, lenders pursue outcomes that better promote a borrower's
economic value, limiting the risks that the borrower takes on and
assuring repayment on the debt. Effective debt governance is also
evidenced by lenders taking steps to preserve a borrower's enterprise
value through debt restructuring-for example, using write-downs,
debt-for-equity exchanges, or delayed debt repayment. 12 0
The CDS radically transforms this alignment of interests. As
argued by Hu and Black, when a lender purchases credit protection on
its debt, it loses motivation to exercise its debt governance rights in a
responsible way. As a result, the lender becomes more interested in
securing private rents through a repayment of the CDS rather than in
monitoring and preserving the borrower's enterprise value. 12 1 In short,
these lenders become "empty creditors"-creditors in name onlywithout holding economic risk vis-A-vis the borrower on their books.122
The social costs created by empty creditors can be enormous.123
Lenders with no skin in the game may needlessly destroy enterprise

119. See Bolton & Oehmke, supra note 1, at 2617 (presenting a finance-theory viewpoint
modeling the operation of empty creditors from an ex ante and ex post perspectives); Lubben,
supra note 1, at 405 (discussing the incentives of lenders using credit derivatives in
restructurings); Tung, supra note 1, at 167-69 ("Derivatives markets enable investors to
construct portfolios that disaggregate cash flow rights from the control rights associated with
their investments."). See generally Hu & Black, Debt Decoupling, supra note 1 (discussing the
problems created by equity derivatives); Hu & Black, Empty Voting II, supra note 1 (same); Hu &
Black, Hedge Fund Insiders,supra note 1 (same).
120. Danis, supra note 1, at 2.
121. Hu & Black, Debt Decoupling, supra note 1, at 18-19 ("Even a creditor with zero,
rather than negative, economic ownership may want to push a company into bankruptcy,
because the bankruptcy filing will trigger a contractual payout on its credit default
swap position.").
122. It should be noted that lenders still assume risk on the protection seller. In other
words, they still depend on the protection seller being solvent enough to make good on the
promised CDS protection. This counterparty risk exists between the parties to the CDS.
123. See Lubben, supra note 1, at 405 (discussing the incentives of lenders using credit
derivatives in restructurings); Subrahmanyam et al., supra note 4, at 9-11 (an empirical study of
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value because they will be less likely to take steps that will benefit the
borrower's economic health. For example, they will be less likely to
exercise good debt governance, to prevent excessive risk taking, or to
support needed restructurings. Where empty creditors extend credit to
risky or losing businesses, these failings do more than just destroy the
borrower's enterprise value. They also create externalities for the
financial system as a whole. 124
The costs of separating economic risk from control rights are
widely noted. First, finance theory increasingly recognizes the costs
CDSs impose. Professors Bolton and Oehmke, for example, argue that
while CDSs can have benefits in debt governance, they can also
impose significant costs. They posit that lenders are likely to
overinsure their debt by purchasing more credit protection than the
value of their underlying debt. In this way, lenders become more likely
to push for inefficient outcomes by seeking to be repaid quickly under
the CDS, or by extracting maximum rents from the borrower, owing to
their strong bargaining position.
Second, empirical studies have demonstrated that CDSs can
have pernicious effects on debt governance.125 A study of 901
companies, for instance, noted that their likelihood of suffering
a credit downgrade and overall deterioration in creditworthiness
increased with the start of CDS trading on their debt.126 The study
suggests that the blame for this decline lies with empty creditors, who
become uninterested in debt restructuring. Similarly, another study
notes that CDS trading on a firm's debt leads to a marked decline in
the firm's ability to restructure through a distressed debt exchange
that reduces the amount this firm must repay. This, the study argues,
can lead to such firms suffering a higher incidence of default. 127
Third, a series of high profile examples dating from the earliest
days of CDS trading also showcases the harmful effects of empty

901 firms with CDS trading on their debt to show these are more susceptible to default or a
decline in credit quality, attributable, authors suggest, to poor lender monitoring).
124. Jordan M. Barry et al., On Derivatives Markets and Social Welfare: A Theory of Empty
Voting and Hidden Ownership 2 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 122,
2012) (arguing that empty voting can make markets unstable, unpredictable, and inefficient).
125. Some studies note that the empty creditor hypothesis is difficult to prove empirically.
For alternative viewpoints on the empty creditor perspective and a review of the literature
detailing the complexities of investigating the operation of the empty creditor hypothesis and
possible lack of application, see Mascia Bedendo et al., Distressed Debt Exchanges in the
Presence of Credit Default Swaps 3 (Nov. 15, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://perma.cc/7NZM-7JRL (noting that their study did not find evidence that CDS led to
greater incidence of bankruptcy over out-of-court workouts).
126. Subrahmanyam et al., supranote 4, at 22.
127. Danis, supranote 1, at 34.
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creditors. Indeed, some commentators have gone so far as to suggest
that, when restructuring proposals fail or attract low creditor
participation, credit derivatives are usually to blame. 128 In 2003,
Mirant Corporation, a Georgia-based energy company, filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection when discussions with its creditors,
a number of whom had purchased CDS protection against Mirant's
debts, broke down. The proceedings highlighted that the company
would still hold value even after Mirant repaid all of its creditors. In
other words, Mirant still remained viable and retained net economic
value for its shareholders. As creditors had succeeded in pushing a
viable enterprise into bankruptcy, it seemed that empty creditors had
prevailed.129
Similarly, in 2010, the technology firm Unisys was forced to
improve the deal for its CDS-protected creditors to coax them into
restructuring Unisys's debt. In its proposal to bondholders, Unisys
offered to exchange outstanding notes for senior secured debt at a rate
of ninety-five cents on the dollar and twenty percent in cash, making
the bonds more valuable than at par value-that is, the face value of
the original bonds. This remarkable result points to creditors that
enjoyed an especially strong bargaining position versus the borrower.
Lenders could extract high rents by virtue of being hedged under
CDSs, knowing that if they failed they would be protected anyway.130
Empty creditors have also been implicated in the restructurings of
Harrah's Entertainment, General Motors and Chrysler, Six Flags,
General Growth Properties, and others. Indeed, the impact of empty
creditors has been viewed as so potent and costly that any decision to
start restructuring must often begin by determining the value of CDSs
outstanding on existing debt.131 Unfortunately, despite the costs,
policymakers have not given serious attention to the problem, leaving
these externalities to reverberate unchecked across Main Street.
In summary, the empty creditor hypothesis develops three core
propositions: (i) lenders lose interest in debt governance once they
trade the economic risk of this loan to a credit protection seller; (ii)
with a CDS in play, lenders are chiefly interested in recouping the
payment on the CDS and enjoying a quick exit; and (iii) this behavior
128. Henny Sender, CDS Investors Hold the Cards as CDS as Groups Try to Exchange Debt,
http://perma.cc/8WZ5-RDDN (ft.com, archived Feb. 5, 2014).
129. For discussion, see Bolton & Oehmke, supranote 1, at 2620-22.
130. Sender, supra note 128; see also, Bolton & Oehmke, supra note 1, at 2621-23
(discussing remedies to overcome the inefficiencies caused by excess insurance).
131. Sender, supra note 128; Michael S. Rosenwald, Plagued by Debt, Six Flags Faces Its
Own Wild Ride, http://perma.cclE59B-ALWX (washingtonpost.com, archived Feb. 5, 2014).
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leads to perverse outcomes in debt governance and bankruptcy, where
lenders can push even viable debtors to fail. The hypothesis is
anchored in the CDS instrument's basic design and in the CDS's
ability to separate the economic risk in debt from the legal rights that
frame that risk. Where lenders no longer constitute the locus where
economic risk and legal control align, theory argues, the consequences
are overwhelmingly negative.
B. The Promiseof Cooperation
Despite the grim prognosis offered by the empty creditor
hypothesis, the picture is not as bleak as it might initially appear. The
empty creditor hypothesis presents only a partial perspective on CDS
trading and debt governance. Indeed, a further dynamic animates the
CDS markets, one arising from the tension between CDS protection
buyers and protection sellers. Although lenders lose interest in the
exercise of their control rights in debt, these rights (and the influence
they carry) assume tremendous significance for the CDS protection
seller. The CDS protection seller-the economic lender for all intents
and purposes-holds risk but no corresponding legal rights to
safeguard its interest.132 To cure this deficit, a protection seller should,
in theory, possess strong incentives to acquire control rights and
influence, in order to reduce the risk the underlying company poses.
These incentives are likely to grow more powerful the closer a debtor
edges towards default. In such cases, protection sellers cannot easily
sell or share their own exposure to the debtor. And lenders are most
likely to behave recklessly in order to trigger repayment on the CDS.
If properly harnessed, these incentives provide a basis on
which to better allocate debt governance responsibilities to those who
have an interest in their exercise and who are less likely to pursue
inefficient outcomes for the borrower. As detailed in Part V, this
Article proposes that lenders and protection sellers be able to trade
control rights in debt with each other in a manner that promotes good
governance and minimizes the potential for abuse on both sides.
However, a first-order problem remains: Why should a lender trade
the debt governance rights and levers at its disposal, given its interest
in seeing a debtor fail and then recouping payment from the CDS
protection seller? After all, this lender has paid for credit protection: it
should want to get its money's worth.
132. It is possible, of course, for protection sellers to protect themselves in other ways, for
example, by buying credit protection on the risks that they hold. However, such methods may be
impractical or expensive, particularly when a debtor poses a risk and any insurance on risks
becomes overly expensive to obtain.
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Despite incentives towards becoming disruptive empty
creditors, however, lenders are subject to several powerful incentives
that can encourage cooperation with the protection seller. As described
below, these include (i) the importance of a lender's reputation, (ii) the
ongoing costs of monitoring viable companies, and (iii) the influence of
unhedged creditors in a company's capital structure. These pressures
are significant in making lenders open to the possibility of trading
debt governance levers with CDS protection sellers in the interests of
promoting better credit discipline.
1. Reputation and Regulation
Reputational capital is key in the CDS market, maybe more so
than anywhere else in the financial markets. Participants in the CDS
market undertake risky transactions on a repeat basis. For most of
the market's history, parties have relied on one another to establish
adequate levels of collateral, risk-management practices, and
disclosure conventions.133 In the historical absence of regulation,
reputational capital has facilitated this interdependence and
functioned as a proxy for hard rules of the road in governing the
conduct of market participants. Reputational capital is significant in
two respects. First, CDS protection buyers can face market and public
reprimand where they fail to exercise sound governance over an
underlying debtor, suggesting that they are not playing fairly in CDS
markets. Anecdotally, at least, some lenders have faced considerable
public rebuke after being revealed as empty creditors. For example, in
the run-up to its Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing in 2009, amusement
park operator Six Flags offered its unsecured creditors an eighty-five
percent equity stake in an effort to restructure its debt outside of
bankruptcy. 34 However, Six Flags failed to gets its creditors on board,
owing, some publically speculated in the news media, to the efforts of
a CDS-protected Fidelity fund that refused to come to the bargaining
table.135
The restructuring of YRC Worldwide, one of the largest
trucking and transportation companies in the United States, provides
another case in point. When YRC met resistance in its efforts to get
the required number of creditors to agree to its debt-for-equity
133. Stout, supra note 8, at 22-24.
134. CDSs and Bankruptcy: No Empty Threat, http://perma.ccl6KGH-GY22 (economist.com,
archived Mar. 3, 2014); Daniel Gross, the Scary Rise of the "Empty Creditor,"
http://perma.cc/N8AC-ETGY (slate.com, archived Mar. 3, 2014).
135. See sources cited supra note 134.
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exchange offer, YRC union members blamed empty creditors for the
resistance.136 The Teamsters, headed by James P. Hoffa (son of the
famous Jimmy), wrote letters to the SEC and New York Attorney
General Andrew Cuomo suggesting that Goldman Sachs and others
were making a market in bonds and CDSs that would encourage
creditors to vote against the exchange offer. 137 As the Teamsters began
preparations to picket before the offices of Brigade Capital
Management, a suspected creditor involved in the strategy, some
firms bought up the bonds from resisting creditors and voted for the
exchange offer. 138 Reports suggest that the firms buying the bonds
from Brigade included those named in Hoffa's letter to the SEC. 13 9
As evident in the case of YRC, reputation and the threat of
peer and public sanction can have a real impact on outcomes for
underlying borrowers. While the CDS market has suffered from
opacity in the past, making it harder to glean the interests and
incentives of empty creditors, the promise of transparency following
the Dodd-Frank Act should make the reputational threat much more
potent. Where lenders worry about being exposed as empty creditors
and as bad bets in the CDS market, they should be more open to
cooperating on, rather than contesting, good debt governance
outcomes. Otherwise, problem creditors face the risk of losing their
reputations both publically and privately within CDS markets. This
might lead to them being charged more for credit protection, or of
seeing only their safest debt covered by protection sellers. 140
Second, bad reputations generate network externalities across
the financial markets as a whole. Where a lender ends up with a bad
loan book, counterparties across all markets-not just the CDS
market-may be wary of doing business with that firm. A toxic
balance sheet, as well as a reputation for recklessness, may well
imperil a lender's ability to raise funds in the capital markets.' 4 '
136. Teamsters Seek Probe of YRC Debt Trading, http://perma.cc/953K-RMBN (joc.com,
archived Mar. 3, 2014).
137. Id.
138. Thomas L. Gallagher, Teamsters Postpone Protest in Support of YRC,
http://perma.cc/4WNG-HVTZ (joc.com, archived Mar. 3, 2014).
139. William B. Cassidy, Hoffa Says Teamsters Build YRC Success, http://perma.ce/Z7UXVH8Y (joc.com, archived Mar. 3, 2014).
140. For example, MBIA, the monoline insurer, provided cover for mortgages in the CDS
market. It provided cover on mortgages extended by Countrywide. When these loan books fell
into default, MBIA and Countrywide became involved in tussles for MBIA to recoup payment for
Countrywide's alleged lack of diligence. See Felix Salmon, MBIA's Volatile Credit Protection,
http://perma.ccl52DT-Y8WR (reuters.com, archived Feb. 5, 2014) (reporting on MBIA CEO Jay
Brown's testimony that he is pursuing banks that lied to him in order to get his money back).
141. See Nada Mora & Andrew Logan, Shocks to Bank Capital:Evidence from UK Banks at
Home and Away 8 (Bank of Eng., Working Paper No. 387, 2011) (noting that banks that suffer
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Lenders that accumulate bad loans on their books create risks for any
other firm that supplies credit to them or that shares risk with them
in supplying credit to borrowers. Returning to Six Flags, for example,
a number of creditors emerged with far greater losses after the
Chapter 11 restructuring than they would have suffered had the outof-court plan gone ahead. The class of unsecured creditors set to get an
eighty-five percent stake in Six Flags under the out-of-court plan
emerged with just one percent after Chapter 11 proceedings. Given
these potential costs to a multiplicity of creditor classes, not just
protection sellers, sources of private discipline can extend beyond the
CDS market. Importantly, where a lender externalizes risks to the
entire market through its recklessness, the attention and ire of
market regulators are likely to soon follow.
Simply put, there are costs involved in behaving recklessly visA-vis underlying debtors. These can be significant and potentially
much higher than the payout likely to be received from triggering
repayment under the CDS. 142 It makes sense, then, for lenders to
consider the trade-off between the gains they may receive from
triggering the CDS against the reputational costs of a high default
rate on loans and those attached to being a problem player in credit
markets.
These costs should motivate lenders to look for ways to share
debt governance responsibilities with others who have incentives to be
diligent. A protection seller provides the most effective option. By
letting the protection sellers provide monitoring and disciplining
services, a lender saves itself cost and effort, and frees up attention to
focus elsewhere. Giving protection sellers a role in debtor oversight
allows an interested and expert actor to suggest how best to maintain
capital shocks often migrate to lending to less risky borrowers); see also Jessica SilverGreenberg, Citigroupto Cut 11,000 Jobs and Take $1 Billion Charge, http://perma.cc/57ZZ-H95N
(dealbook.nytimes.com, archived Feb. 5, 2014) (discussing the costs to Citigroup owing, amongst
other factors, to a glut of bad loans on its books).
142. The Federal Depository Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), for example, supervises banks
alongside the Federal Reserve and other regulators such as the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency. The FDIC provides deposit insurance in cases a bank fails and has expertise in bank
resolution and risk management. As part of its supervisory duties, the FDIC assesses lending
practices, the depth of losses on a bank's loan book. Post-Crisis, the FDIC can charge higher fees
to those banks whose governance practice encourage risk taking. See, e.g., FDIC, RISK
MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES: LOANS

§

3.2, available at http://perma.cc/

54N6-N9XQ (FDIC Risk Management Manual of Examination Policies); Michael R. Crittenden,
FDIC Moves to Tie Fees to Bank Pay, http://perma.cc/C7B-884Z (wsj.com, archived Feb. 5, 2014)
("The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.'s board narrowly agreed to start the process to impose
higher fees on U.S. banks whose compensation plans encourage risky behavior that could
threaten the bank's solvency.").
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the creditworthiness of underlying borrowers. Protection sellers
might, for example, suggest business strategy changes that better
protect the value of a debtor's assets and existing collateral, like liens
over the debtor's accounts receivable or the debtor's inventories. They
may warn lenders when a debtor appears to be borrowing more than it
should or where the debtor is investing in overly risky projects. These
proposals can help dramatically improve the risk profile of debtors,
lenders, and protection sellers. Where a protection seller monitors an
underlying debtor, its scrutiny also disciplines the lender and nudges
this lender to be more diligent. Moreover, where protection sellers
have greater control over the underlying debt and greater confidence
in the lender's good behavior, they may be motivated to lower the cost
of protection. 143
2. Corporate Viability
Empty creditors are present throughout a debtor's life. But the
incentives driving empty creditors differ at each stage. When a
company remains far from default, rather than pushing it towards
default, empty creditors should have strong incentives to maintain
enterprise value. To do so at lower cost, empty creditors should
rationally seek to share the burdens of governance with CDS
protection sellers invested in the sound exercise of creditor control
rights. 144 CDS trading takes place on a variety of companies, from
banks and financial firms to well-known and well-established Main
Street companies, many of which are far from default. 145 It is not easy
to push viable companies towards bankruptcy. And strong borrowers
create a variety of long-term costs for lenders. Monitoring costs, due
diligence responsibilities, requests for waivers, covenant defaults, and
dissipation of collateral-to name just a few-all continue. Moreover,
143. Outside of the CDS market, lenders routinely share governance responsibilities in the
context of loan syndication. Where loans are syndicated between lenders, each individual lender
may have limited incentives to undertake due diligence on the borrower. Often, to avoid the loan
going into default, lenders delegate monitoring to one of the syndicate, normally the lead
underwriter. All syndicate members can share the costs of monitoring and ensure that,
notwithstanding incentives towards laxity, debt discipline is exercised over the loan. See Baird &
Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 1226 (examining the role of creditors in corporate governance
decisions).
144. CDSs pay out if a "credit event" takes place. The definition of "credit event" has been
notoriously problematic. For example, this issue has emerged in the case of CDS payments on
sovereign default. See Christopher Whitehall, US CDS Trigger Still Uncertain, http://perma.cc/
3SFN-YGXP (ifre.com, archived Mar. 3. 2014).
145. For a list of some household corporate names with CDS traded on their debt, see Credit
Default Swap Spreads and S&P 500 Constituents Signals from CDS Widening,
http://perma.cc/P6A7-F9CS (seekingalpha.com, archived Feb. 5, 2014).
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hedged lenders do not wish to lose powerful clients who represent a
source of profit and hold out the promise of future business. Prestige
clients, in the form of large, well-known companies, are a prize for a
lender's business and profile.
Still, lenders who have purchased credit protection may be less
motivated to expend the full costs of monitoring and debt governance.
These costs are additional to the sums that lenders spend to buy credit
protection. Hedged lenders may be less diligent or more willing to
accept a borrower's risky activity, like large capital expenditures or
more frequent dividend payments to shareholders. Lenders may fail to
correct structural problems with a borrower, like poor accounting and
reporting practices. While borrowers might not lurch towards
bankruptcy on account of such lender disinterest, they may end up
using capital inefficiently. For example, scholars have noted that
lender interventions can help make companies operate more
efficiently well outside of the bankruptcy context. In one study of
3,500 covenant violations by U.S. public firms, the authors found that
lender interventions postviolation usually resulted in borrowers
improving operating performance and equity valuation. 146 As noted
earlier, such violations are fairly routine occurrences in corporate life.
Importantly, the authors observed that violating firms earned
statistically significant abnormal returns of around five percent
postviolation and showcased better operating efficiency.147
Clearly, there are gains to be made if lenders exercise good
discipline. Where lenders cannot, owing to poor incentives after
purchasing CDS protection, they can, in theory, help borrowers and
themselves by shifting their debt governance rights to protection
sellers. Lenders save themselves the costs of exercising debt
governance. By allowing an interested party to invest in governance
rights and share the costs of due diligence, lenders can shift their
limited resources elsewhere-for example, to those borrowers whose
risks cannot be hedged. Borrowers, too, benefit when their capital is
more efficiently used. And protection sellers enjoy an opportunity to
ensure reduced risks in the CDS market.
One question bears asking: Why would a protection seller wish
to assume these rights when the borrower is far from bankruptcy and
the CDS protection seller is unlikely to pay out? If a lender cannot
push a viable borrower towards bankruptcy, why should the protection
seller care enough to expend its own money to monitor and discipline a
146. Nini et al., supra note 37, at 2-4.
147. Id.
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borrower? A possible response to this query can be found in the
structure of CDS trade itself.
Recall that the CDS trade between the lender and the
protection seller is supported by the constant provision of collateral.
Importantly, the protection seller must provide collateral as an
underlying debtor becomes riskier. This assures the lender that the
CDS protection seller can pay out in the event that the CDS is
triggered. When borrowers become risky, even if they remain viable,
CDS protection sellers may end up facing capital costs of their own.
They may have to supply collateral under the CDS contract, and
potentially in large amounts. Where the value of the swaps written on
a borrower's debt is extensive-for example, where there is a large
volume of "naked" swaps outstanding-protection sellers may face
expensive collateral calls to reflect incrementally higher risks. With
this in mind, protection sellers can help themselves by working to
maintain borrower creditworthiness and efficiency. If a borrower
operates efficiently and shows sound credit risk management, it is
likely to enjoy more stable CDS spreads.
One additional factor is worth noting. Protection sellers may
become liable to pay out on CDSs across a number of borrowers and
industries owing to increased risks attaching to a single important
borrower. Large borrowers can interconnect with other enterprises.
Firms in similar industries or linked through supply chains may come
to be seen as being more risky simply because they are linked to a
prominent borrower. A large borrower's deteriorating credit quality
can also give rise to a general market shock that creates higher CDS
spreads across the corporate sector. If CDS protection sellers can
control risks attaching to a central borrower, they may also help to
reduce the perceived riskiness of other linked companies.
Of course, this argument is speculative. But the CDS market
has shown evidence of such correlations in the past. The 2005 credit
downgrades of General Motors and Ford provide one important
illustration. When the credit rating of GM and Ford was downgraded
to junk status, the market saw CDS spreads rise not only across the
auto industry but also across a range of industries, including oil and
gas, consumer services, and technology.148 This rise in CDS spreads
reversed eventually. However, these co-movements in CDS spreads
between an important borrower and others illustrate the significance

148. Viral Acharya, Stephen Schaefer & Yili Zhang, Liquidity Risk and Correlation Risk: A
Clinical Study of the General Motors and Ford Downgrade of May 2005, at 3-5 (Aug. 2008)
(unpublished manuscript), availableat http://perma.cc/6L2R-MAAC.
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of preserving the creditworthiness of key viable borrowers in order to
prevent ripple effects across the corporate debt market.
3. Creditor Competition
The positive influence of other creditors can make it harder for
hedged lenders to pursue reckless and disruptive outcomes vis-a-vis
underlying borrowers. Faced with the costs involved in negotiating
with other creditors, CDS-protected lenders can be motivated to
cooperate with protection sellers in the exercise of debt governance.
Companies often have multiple creditors. Their interplay
means that empty creditors cannot always achieve what they want
because they face pressure from other interested creditors. A
company's various creditors can include banks as well as bondholders,
each with varying intensities of control over the enterprise. Some of
these creditors might buy CDS protection; others may not. Not all
lenders buy CDS protection on the loans that they extend. Some may
choose to avoid using CDSs altogether. 149 Certain lenders that use
CDSs may do so in an effort to reduce the regulatory burdens they
face-buying themselves space on their balance sheets in order to lend
more-rather than to recoup payment on the loan made. A company's
capital structure-particularly when it includes multiple creditorscan represent an arena of competitive creditor control.
This multiplicity of creditors makes it hard for any single
creditor to force its will on the others. And it makes it particularly
difficult for empty creditors to push the company into extinction when
other creditors would prefer that the company succeed. Thus, empty
creditors can face high transaction costs (for example, the direct costs
associated with negotiating or litigating with other creditors, or the
associated reputational damage from the resulting delays) when they
seek to force the company into default. 150
Findings emerging from recent bankruptcy proceedings are
illustrative. In an extensive study, for example, Professors Ayotte and
Morrison have observed that intercreditor conflict is rife, especially
between senior secured and unsecured creditors.15 ' The interests of
these creditor groups routinely diverge, with unsecured creditors
149. Minton et al., supra note 110, at 4.
150. See Overview of Goldman Sachs' Financing Transaction with CIT Group,
http://perma.cc/AY5E-L9YR (goldmansachs.com archived Feb. 5, 2014) (issuing a statement
denying that CDSs on CIT Group debt were purchased to profit from CIT Group's bankruptcy);
Rosenwald, supra note 130.
151. See generally Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 37.
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usually more interested in pursuing longer restructurings versus
secured creditors who may be more willing to push for a quicker
resolution and repayment on their debt. 152 Importantly, outcomes turn
on negotiation between these creditor groups and on the strength of
their bargaining positions in any one case. 153 For example, where a
secured creditor takes out security whose value exceeds that of its
debt, it may be more likely to succeed in achieving its preferred
outcomes.1 54 Other secured creditors whose security is less than the
value of their debt may be more willing to negotiate with others. 55
Additionally, secured lenders tend to exercise a high and precise
degree of creditor control in insolvency proceedings and retain
considerable sway in tilting the direction of outcomes for the debtor.156
Enter the empty creditors. Their success in pushing their own
preferences in bankruptcy is likely to turn heavily on the power and
sway held by other creditors in a company's capital structure and on
the cost-benefit trade-offs of action. Empty creditors may only be
willing to expend resources to negotiate with other creditors when
they have purchased far greater amounts of protection than their
underlying debt. Even in such cases, they must account for possible
pushback from other creditors, such as unsecured lenders further
down the priority ladder that wish to get repaid. These negotiations
and the uncertainty of resolution create costs that should
disincentivize action by empty creditors.
Empty creditors, recognizing these constraints, should wish to
shift the costs of debt governance and negotiation to CDS traders that
are invested in its exercise. By shifting monitoring and disciplining
burdens, empty creditors can reduce some of the costs they face in
holding the debt on their books, even if they cannot cheaply exit their
investment by triggering repayment on the CDS.
The presence of multiple creditors is significant in other ways
as well. Specifically, competing creditor classes suggest that, where
one creditor stops monitoring a debtor, other creditors are able to pick
up the slack. If an empty creditor is disengaged or reckless in its
exercise of creditor discipline, creditors wishing to ensure that the
debtor remains viable can continue to monitor a borrower. This can be
seen in the recent rise of bondholder vigilance, whereby engaged

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 512-14.
Id. at 514.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 513-14.
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bondholders have sought out activist strategies to assert creditor
discipline, arguably bringing benefit to the company as a whole.157
Certainly, the traditional lack of transparency in CDS markets
has created serious challenges for interested lenders to control poor
monitoring by others. Without good information, creditors are likely to
make incorrect assumptions about the incentives to other lenders
within the capital structure to monitor the borrower. For example, a
secured lender may simply assume that a large unsecured lender is
monitoring the debtor. The unsecured lender, however, may have
purchased CDS protection and may thus have limited incentives to
monitor. Without fuller information about CDS exposures, the ability
of creditors to engage in collective monitoring can become impaired.
However, as CDS markets move towards greater transparency
post-Crisis, it is likely that these informational deficits may reduce
over time. In other words, creditors will have greater insights into the
actual economic interests of others and may thus apply more accurate
assumptions regarding their motivations towards debt governance.
Hedged lenders might see others stepping in to monitor a debtor
where they themselves may be unwilling to do so.
This underscores the point that empty creditors face a variety
of considerations in determining whether or not to act with perverse
incentives vis-A-vis a debtor. Where empty creditors are met by
competing creditors, it makes sense to consider allowing another party
to assume some of the costs of debt governance.
C. Reducing ParticipationCosts
The CDS market creates significant interdependence between
protection buyer and protection sellers, laying the groundwork for
cooperation rather than conflict.
The CDS market is unique. A few features stand out. First, the
market has historically traded complex risks bilaterally between
private players. 15 8 Second, CDSs facilitate the processes of credit

157. For more detail, see Kahan & Rock, supra note 68, at 183.
158. NASSIM TALEB, BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE 225 (2d ed.
2010) (discussing the formation of "tail risks," extreme but rare risk events arising out of
complex financial trading); Viral Acharya et al., Manufacturing Tail Risk: A Perspective on the
Financial Crisis 2007-9, 4 FOUND. & TRENDS FIN. 247, 251 (2010) (discussing the extreme and
correlated risks resulting from large firms taking on too much leverage). For an insightful
discussion of the challenges of modeling credit risk, see Daniel Goldstein & Nassim Taleb, We

Don't Quite Know What We Are Talking About When We Talk About Volatility, 33 J. PORTFOLIO
MGMT. 4, 84-86 (2007); Benjamin Yibin Zhang et al., Explaining Credit Default Swap Spreads
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formation in the economy. By allowing banks and others to hedge
risks, they enable these firms to lend more cheaply than they
otherwise might do.' 59 At the same time, they also clearly constitute a
powerful source of profit for financial firms. The upside for protection
sellers comes when they make money by covering the risks of others
(and not having to pay out). Protection buyers make money by hedging
their risks through a CDS and lending more. Speculators gain by
taking synthetic exposures on underlying debt using a CDS, without
incurring the full capital costs of this investment but winning all the
same if they happen to be on the right side of the bet.o60 Third, the
market comprises a small number of repeat players that trade
regularly with one another. The types of firms might diverge. Banks,
mutual funds, insurers, and hedge funds represent a diverse mix with
varying levels of regulatory constraint, investment habits, and
objectives. But at a high level of generalization, this market functions
through mutual reliance: one set of institutions buys credit protection,
and another set of specialists at the end of the chain supply it. Within
this dynamic, speculators of all stripes dip in and out of the arena,
relying on, and contributing to, its liquidity.161
This basic interdependence yields an important friction.
Superficially, the market is clearly adversarial. The protection buyer
purchases a CDS and hopes for a quick repayment. On the other side,
the CDS protection seller-like any rational insurer-does not wish to
pay out. Parties jockey for collateral to support the risks of the

with Equity Volatility and Jump Risks of Individual Firms 1-3 (Bank of Int'l Settlements,
Working Paper No. 181, 2005).
159. Alessio Saretto & Heather Tookes, Corporate Leverage, Debt Maturity and Credit
Default Swaps: The Role of Credit Supply 12 (Mar. 7, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://perma.cc/XB9S-3RXX; see also Adam Ashcraft & Joao Santos, Has the Credit Default
Swap Market Lowered the Cost of Corporate Debt?, 56 J. MONETARY ECON. 514 (2009) (arguing
that CDSs do not reduce the interest rates at which an average firm can borrow in the bond and
bank debt market); HIRTLE, supra note 110, at 125 (showing that banks that used CDSs
extended more credit); Mitchell Petersen & Raghuram Rajan, The Benefits of Lending
Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data, 49 J. FIN. 3, 7 (1994) (showing that hedging
strategies can increase the supply of credit to small businesses).
http://perma.cc/QF42-MYRN
The
Greatest Trade Ever,
Gross,
160. Daniel
(thedailybeast.com, archived Feb. 5, 2014); Jesse Eisinger & Jared Bernstein, The Magnetar
Trade: How One Hedge Fund Helped Keep the Bubble Going, http://perma.cc/DVT9-J9UR
(propublica.org, archived Feb. 5, 2014).
161. For example, certain actors enter the market to take on or otherwise engage in pure
speculative trading on CDS markets without holding any underlying interest. These positions
express a positive or negative assessment of the underlying asset's likelihood of default. As an
illustration, some hedge funds bought "naked" CDS protection against mortgages in anticipating
that these were likely to default, which they did during the housing downturn, generating large
gains for the speculators. Gross, supra note 160.
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contract, ensuring that each side's position is covered at all times. 162
At face value, parties' interests appear to be perpetually in conflict.
However, there is more to this relation than meets the eye.
As a starting point, both sides can maximize the gains from
their participation where they can enter and use this market with
minimal transaction costs. Everyone stands to lose where it becomes
prohibitively expensive for one or other side to enter the CDS market:
lenders might not find a protection seller, and sellers might not find a
lender. Conversely, both sides can maximize the gains from their
participation where they can enter and use this market with minimal
transaction costs. In other words, protection buyers can best help
themselves by having the ability to cost-effectively protect a broader
spectrum of risky debt using CDSs. Similarly, protection sellers can
save costs where they provision as cheaply as possible for the credit
risks that they assume. Cheaper participation enables protection
buyers to lend more and protection sellers to provide expanded credit
protection.
Take the case of a lender that must regularly purchase CDS
protection on the loans that it extends to corporate borrowers. To
procure credit protection, it relies on a group of protection sellers.
Assume the lender wishes to behave disruptively toward its borrower,
pushing the borrower ever closer towards default. This behavior
imposes costs on the protection sellers by increasing both the
likelihood of pay out and the levels of required collateral. Moreover,
protection sellers have no means to control the underlying borrowers
or to counteract the lender's negative actions, increasing yet further
the protection sellers' costs of transacting in the CDS market.
Certainly, the lender might win in a few cases, able to recoup payment
on its CDS. But if the lender behaves disruptively on a repeated basis,
in the bigger picture, it loses. Where the lender repeatedly represents
a source of risk for other CDS traders, obtaining credit protection from
protection sellers will be more costly in the long run. These protection
sellers, too, will face higher costs of participation owing to the lender's
behavior. The protection sellers may even eventually leave the
market. When this happens, the lender has even fewer options in its
search for affordable credit protection.
Keeping transaction costs low is especially important for the
CDS market. Market participants routinely handle a volatile assetnamely, credit risk-which can be hard to model and expensive to

162. Cohan, supra note 82.
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provision for through protective capital cushions. 163 As a result, the
''participation costs" of entering this market are already fairly steep
and reflected in the market reality that only the largest financial
firms tend to participate.
An additional factor reinforces this shared interest to keep
participation costs low. While participants broadly fall into the buyer
or seller camp, most routinely undertake both types of functions. It
follows that, while parties adopt an adversarial posture in some
transactions, viewed as a whole, the CDS market represents an arena
for a repeat game. Where parties are continually transacting with
each other, they can help themselves by helping each other to keep
transaction costs low. This enables firms to participate in the CDS
market more cheaply and to improve their cost-benefit trade-offs.
Despite its superficially adversarial posture, the market facilitates
cooperation through its small cast of actors and history of bilateral
dealings. In game-theoretic terms, at its broadest, the CDS market
represents a form of assurance game, where parties have a common
interest to cooperate in order to maintain their participation-a far
greater prize that is over and above gains in any single CDS
transaction.164
As parties participate in this market on a repeat basis, facing
an uncertain outcome with respect to whether or not the CDS pays off,
additional incentives to cooperate and keep costs low exist. Parties on
both sides take a position on the future creditworthiness of an
underlying debt obligation. In theory, ultimate payoffs depend on who
has the better estimate of the likelihood of an underlying company
defaulting. In the absence of "smoking gun" information, the trade
represents an educated position regarding the future of an underlying
company. In many cases, default might never happen for the life of the
contract. After all, CDSs trade on all types of household company

163. The Dodd-Frank Act is likely to alter the cost calculus somewhat but not
fundamentally. The Dodd-Frank Act requires that parties move CDS trading to swap execution
facilities (akin to exchanges for CDS contracts) and to clear these contracts through
clearinghouses. Moving contracts to regulated exchanges and clearinghouses is likely to reduce
the costs of participation through increased transparency, reduced counterparty risks, and more
standardized contracts. At the same time, the OTC market continues to exist and parties must
still provide for the complex risks that they assume. For further detail on reforms and the risks
underlying their implementation, see Sean J. Griffith, Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a

Governance Structure for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 61 EMORY L.J. 1153, 1177-80 (2012),
which discusses the problematic risks that clearinghouses face in clearing OTC derivatives.
Yadav, supra note 8, at 441.
164. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 35-37 (1994). See generally,
BRIAN SKYRMS, THE STAG HUNT AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE (2004) (discussing
how parties behave and interact in Rousseau's classic game 'The Stag Hunt").
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names, many of which are successful and far from default. 65 But
because the costs to maintain the contract continue for the length of
the bargain, incentives to cooperate are compelling. The protection
buyer pays for protection but does not receive repayment on the CDS.
Meanwhile, the protection seller, while not paying out, must still
provision for the contingency on its books.166 Given the length of the
CDS contract and the range of companies it can cover, cooperation to
control risk reduces costs and fosters goodwill in a concentrated
market of repeat players.
D. So Why Are CDS Traders Not Cooperating?
This Article suggests that, contrary to conventional wisdom,
credit derivatives can improve debt governance rather than consign it
to failure. Instead of purely adversarial motives, CDS traders should
have powerful incentives to cooperate, thereby improving outcomes in
debt governance. The market constitutes an arena for a classical
assurance game: parties can maximize gains where they cooperate
together to win a grand prize. However, as with any assurance game,
cooperation is not always straightforward. 67 In particular, effective
cooperation requires parties to (i) possess high levels of information
such that they may understand each other's strategies;168 and (ii)
ensure that they are not distracted by smaller payoffs that prevent
them from cooperating to achieve the bigger prize.169
Still, why are CDS traders not already cooperating? If
incentives to do so are as compelling as this Article suggests, then we
should be seeing greater cooperation between lenders and protection
sellers in matters of debt governance.
165. Alanna Byrne, Credit Default Swaps Top Movers: Argentina and Duke Realty,
http://perma.cd4UEX-7TKK (futuresmag.com, archived Feb. 5, 2014); John Glover, Europe's
$180 Billion of Maturities Lifts Swaps: Credit Markets, http://perma.cclLLS4-N32Z
(bloomberg.com, archived Feb. 5, 2014); 2009: What a Year for Distressed Debt!,
http://perma.cc/WRD2-FHTA (distressed-debt-investing.com, archived Feb. 5, 2014).
166. Of course, this provisioning must be regarded as a positive externality from the
perspective of market stability: financial firms pose fewer risks when they are over- rather than
underprotected.
167. I am very grateful to Professor Chris Brummer for insights in this area.
168. See Posner et al., supra note 22, at 4-5 (providing a demonstration involving The Stag
Hunt Game, and suggesting that the game is facilitated in practice when the players can
communicate with each other).
169. Smaller payoffs are referred to as "hares" in the terminology of the assurance game.
When individual players pursue their own private gains, they are unable to cooperate to catch
the proverbial stag. For further discussion of the collective action problems that arise between
players, see BAIRD ET AL., supranote 164, at 35-36.
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One response may be that that cooperation could well exist
already in CDS markets, albeit on an ad hoc and opaque basis. With
the high levels of secrecy shrouding this market, its activities have
been notoriously difficult to grasp. Particularly, if CDS traders
transact with one another without relying on intermediary dealers,
then there may certainly be a chance that debt governance negotiation
also takes place behind closed doors.
But there are significant legal and regulatory barriers to
cooperation that likely make CDS traders reluctant to cooperate and
to admit to such cooperation if they have in fact done so from time to
time. Most obviously, there are clear legal constraints and
uncertainties. Cooperation on issues of debt governance may imply
that lenders are breaching their duties of confidentiality to their
borrowers, or that they are involved in a form of insider trading.
Antitrust concerns may also arise if lenders and CDS traders are
considered to be engaging in collusive behavior in determining how a
borrower should behave.
Deeper problems exist as well. Ad hoc debt governance
arrangements for CDSs are unknown and raise serious legal
questions. These arrangements may fail to withstand judicial scrutiny
when protection sellers seek recognition of their informal bargain with
a lender, for example, in insolvency proceedings. Unlike CDS
contracts, which transfer economic risk between CDS traders, no such
contractual conventions exist for the simple transfer of debt
governance rights and responsibilities. Parties must fully internalize
the costs of negotiation and of maintaining and privately enforcing
their bargain.
This Article raises several questions for future enquiry, the
critical one being, "Which debt governance rights may be legally
transferable between CDS lenders and protection sellers?" Also of
great importance is how these transfers might take place. But at
present, the answers remain elusive. With this legal uncertainty, CDS
traders may be unwilling to stake millions of dollars on informal
bargains even if they wished to cooperate in the interests of debt
governance.
From the logistical perspective, the historic lack of
transparency in the market creates its own barriers to cooperation.
Without adequate information, parties may be unable to identify those
who possess debt governance levers, those who might wish to share
them, and the cost at which any trading might occur. Indeed, it is
well-established that CDS markets are notoriously opaque. While
some scholars presume that bad debt governance is a function of CDS
trading, this phenomenon may in fact be a matter of poor institutional
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design. In other words, poor information sharing, not necessarily the
nature of CDS trading itself, might constitute the real barrier to good
governance.
In summary, the empty creditor hypothesis only partially
explains the impact of CDS trading on corporate governance. This
Article shows that there exist other forces that shape the borrowerlender relationship. Lenders can lose their reputation when they
behave recklessly, or face public sanction and higher costs of capital in
exercising poor debt governance. Moreover, viable companies and
other competing creditors diminish the likelihood that empty creditors
will succeed in triggering a default and recouping payment under the
CDS. Lenders and protection sellers can benefit where they can share
the costs of debt governance. In a concentrated market of repeat
players, cooperation, not conflict, can generate long-term rewards for
lenders and protection sellers alike.
V. THE NEW MARKET IN DEBT GOVERNANCE

This Part proposes the creation of a market in debt governance
as a cure to the empty creditor problem and the challenges the CDS
market imposes on the borrower-lender relationship. Credit
derivatives can generate enormous costs for ordinary companies by
weakening the effectiveness of debt governance. A market to trade
control rights in debt would harness the cooperative incentives of
lenders and protection sellers to allocate the responsibilities of debt
governance to those most driven to use them. It also would motivate
CDS traders who hold economic risk on a debtor to also invest in
control rights that help to mitigate risk through better monitoring and
discipline. The goal of the market lies in restoring the broken nexus
between economic risk in debt and the control rights critical to
managing this risk, thereby helping to promote more efficient credit
management in the economy.
This Article outlines the key features of a debt governance
market. It represents the first step in the analysis, offering several
pathways for further enquiries to flesh out the institutional details to
govern such a market. This market will impact numerous regulatory
regimes and the regulators that oversee them. CDS contracts
implicate securities regulation, financial stability, corporate law, and
bankruptcy. With this extensive reach, this Article presumes
cooperation between regulators and courts to enable the creation of
this market and to maintain its operation. It leaves open the question
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of which of these regulators may be best placed to exercise primary
oversight of a market in debt governance.
A. Market Mechanics
From the Coasian perspective, in the absence of transaction
costs, lenders and protection sellers should arrive at an optimal risk
and control-sharing arrangement to reflect their needs and monitoring
abilities in exercising debt governance vis-A-vis a borrower.170 A
market in debt governance allows lenders and credit protection sellers
to bargain in the levers of creditor control. In outlining the rationales
and central features of such a market, this Article proposes a
corrective influence to reduce the costs of empty creditors in credit
markets.
1. Rationales for Commoditizing Control
A market for creditor control seeks to create a formal
mechanism for lenders and CDS protection sellers to trade and share
control rights in debt. As detailed in Part II, debt contracts routinely
allow lenders access to an array of control rights, as well as soft
influence over a borrower. Reporting and monitoring covenants, veto
power over capital expenditures, influence on management, alongside
legal standing in bankruptcy all comprise the debt governance
framework that lenders rely on to control their risk. With a market in
debt governance, protection sellers that hold credit risk on an
underlying borrower will gain a means of acquiring these tried-andtested control levers to help control their risk. This market is likely to
be of greatest significance to those who are net protection sellers in
credit markets. Institutions like pension funds, insurers, and mutual
funds that are emerging as specialist protection sellers will benefit
most from a mechanism to acquire debt governance levers to better
safeguard their vast exposure.
A formal space to trade control rights in debt lowers
transaction costs by reducing search costs for participants. It ensures
that trades take place in the open and with information sharing
between participants. This transparency should help CDS traders
overcome a central barrier to cooperation: a lack of information on
underlying CDS exposures. This market should help place debt
governance cooperation on a firm legal footing, ensuring that these

170. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960)
(providing a theory on risk and resource allocation).
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interactions enjoy legal recognition and are not likely to fall foul of
insider trading, privacy, antitrust, or other laws. Finally, with such
trading regulators, the market and underlying debtors can understand
the motivations and risk preferences of the actors involved. This
understanding will allow regulators and underlying debtors to hold
lenders of all stripes more fully to account.171
There exist powerful policy rationales for creating a market in
debt governance. First, the market would provide a corrective to the
empty creditor problem. It would allow credit protection sellers-who
are economically motivated to use levers of control-to invest and
agitate for good governance, diminishing the voice of empty creditors.
Loan covenants and lender influence would acquire greater bite and
would encourage more efficient flows of credit.172
Second, a market in debt governance would bring transparency
to reveal risk taking in corporate lending. The scrutiny of the CDS
market can serve as a watchful check on debtor companies that
misuse their capital. In other words, protection sellers-possessing
tools to better monitor debtors-would be able to expose risky
borrower behavior. In this manner, engaged oversight from protection
sellers would reign in borrower recklessness by shaming and
pressuring management to act responsibly.173
In addition, transparency offers CDS participants a channel to
share information and, with deeper information, to discipline one
another in case of defection from group norms. Importantly,
information from the CDS market can provide evidence of lender
mismanagement. Where the CDS market shows that a borrower is
becoming risky and overleveraged, it shines a light on the conduct of
lenders that supply credit to a company. Where lenders supply credit
without sufficient attention to the risks presented, they should suffer
reprimand from peers. After all, peer firms stand to lose if the debtor
defaults and the protection seller is forced to pay out. This peer
pressure can prevent CDS traders from shirking their responsibilities
towards debt governance. It can help make credit markets more
efficient where, by this soft oversight function, (i) borrowers receive
only as much credit as they are able to handle; (ii) lenders are
motivated to exercise greater caution in lending and in the exercise of
171. These legal regimes are discussed infra in Part V.B.1.

172. See, e.g., Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt Investing, supra note 15, at 123-25
(discussing the Kmart turnaround).
173. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in CorporateLaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1829-30
(2001) (discussing the important role of shaming in shaping behavior in the corporate
marketplace).
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debt governance; and (iii) market players are quicker to internalize
the implications of risk taking and to provision for this risk taking on
an ex ante basis.
2. Commoditizing Control Rights
A market in debt governance requires the lender and
protection seller to be able to trade control rights in the underlying
debt contract with one another.
Ordinarily, creditors can acquire control rights by purchasing
debt instruments outright. In other words, creditors invest in the
actual bonds or loans and thereby become lenders of record vis-A-vis
debtors. At other times, creditors might assign rights under loans to
third parties. Assignment of rights under a loan contract usually
entails an assignee enjoying the benefits of repayment from the debtor
and, for all intents and purposes, becoming the lender to the borrower,
acquiring the full benefits of the legal rights provided in the loan
agreement.
But, the CDS market is different. For one, a protection seller
contracts with another CDS trader. It does not enter into any
arrangement with an underlying debtor. 17 4 And a key rationale
driving protection sellers to the CDS trade is to acquire synthetic
exposure to an underlying debt instrument. This synthetic investment
is, generally speaking, much cheaper than buying the underlying loan
or bond. If protection sellers must pay for a wholesale assignment of
rights from a lender, it makes sense to consider buying the underlying
debt instrument. 7 5
A market in debt governance envisions lenders and protection
sellers agreeing to "borrow" control rights for a period of time.
Certainly, a first-order question exists as to which rights can legally
be borrowed or temporarily transferred-and deeper analysis of the
issue is necessary. However, a borrowing arrangement appears most
feasible in this context, although purchasing these rights might also
be possible. A temporary borrowing arrangement better reflects that
CDS contracts do not always extend for the term of the loan and may
174. This situation changes when repayment on the CDS is triggered. In such cases, the
protection seller pays out and acquires the underlying debt instrument (e.g., a bond), gaining
rights under that instrument. For discussion in relation to the Eastman Kodak restructuring, see
Melissa Mott, Kodak CDS Auction Sheds Light on Settlement Process, http://perma.cc/768S-2349
(reuters.com, archived Feb. 5, 2014).
175. See, e.g., Manson, Iver & York v. Black, 176 Cal. App. 4th 36, 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)
('An assignment transfers the interest of the assignor to the assignee. Thereafter, '[tihe assignee
stands in the shoes of the assignor, taking his rights and remedies, subject to any defenses which
the obligor has against the assignor prior to notice of the assignment.' ").
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be entered into for a period of time. For example, the CDS contract
may cover only a five-year period of a ten-year loan. When the CDS
contract ends, these rights revert back to the lender, as the economic
risk is back on the lender's books.
Instead of seeking to acquire all the rights in a loan agreement,
a protection seller can select a few rights that may be especially
helpful. A protection seller, for instance, might desire to use only
rights to monitor a debtor's secured assets, notification rights on key
corporate events, or rights to control additional borrowing by the
debtor. By allowing protection sellers to choose certain key rights to
exercise, the market reduces the costs of intervention-it is likely
cheaper to acquire specific rights under a loan contract than it is to
acquire all the rights available. Lenders may also be unwilling to part
with all control rights and may prefer ceding control only over a
selected few. 76 There is always the risk that lenders might engage in
some form of holdout behavior, refusing to let protection sellers
acquire the rights sought or perhaps charging high amounts.
However, this Article demonstrates that lenders gain by allowing
protection sellers to assume monitoring responsibilities and to assist
in managing underlying risks. Moreover, protection sellers, too, might
engage in tit-for-tat behavior by raising the cost of credit protection to
reflect the increased risks they face.
But how would such an arrangement work legally? Does the
lender assign selected rights to a protection seller with an agreement
that they be reassigned back to the lender at a later date (for example,
at the end of the CDS contract between the lender and the protection
seller)? This seems clumsy. It also creates the risk that borrowers
become confused regarding lender accountability. A lender may be
liable for certain actions but not for others, where a protection seller is
also involved in the exercise of creditor control.
One way forward lies in deeming a lender to be the agent for a
protection seller with respect to the exercise of particular rights and
responsibilities in the underlying contract. A lender follows the
direction of the protection seller and interacts with the borrower on

176. Assignment of select rights is commonplace, especially in the context of debt collection.
See, for example, discussion surrounding the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692a(4) (2012). The Act defines a "creditor" to be:
[A]ny person who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed,
but such term does not include any person to the extent that he receives an
assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely for the purpose of facilitating
collection of such debt for another.

Id.
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behalf of the protection seller. An agency agreement poses fewer
challenges for underlying debtors, who can still continue to engage
with their usual lenders of record. Underlying debtors do not have to
transact with a multitude of sophisticated actors; instead, they work
with the lender with which they are most familiar. Lenders can still be
held liable by their debtors. But a lender can in turn pursue a
protection seller for misfeasance, for example, where protection sellers
are overintrusive or proffer advice that is harmful to underlying
debtors. A greater benefit also accrues. Lenders cannot completely
disengage from debt governance when subject to such agency
arrangements. Continuing accountability to a debtor and scrutiny
from a protection seller can control instances of lender slack. At the
same time, the potentially disruptive voice of the empty creditor is
substituted by that of the protection seller with risk on its books. Such
arrangements encourage lender cooperation but also intercreditor
monitoring to control the risk that each lender faces from one
another.177

3. Search Costs and Informational Gains
A key challenge for CDS traders seeking to cooperate in
relation to debt governance lies in searching out counterparties with
which to trade control rights. Protection sellers and lenders must find
each other.
Transparency has traditionally been a big problem in CDS
markets. CDS transactions have historically operated over the
counter, and trade reporting has been ad hoc and largely
unregulated.178 The OTC nature of the market has meant that
although some trades are executed directly between parties and are
not therefore anonymous, other trades are intermediated by dealers. 179
Dealers provide intermediary services that bring clients together to
execute CDSs. The ultimate clients in such cases may never know the
identity of the other counterparty. Sometimes, dealers themselves
may be providing protection to lenders, at least until such time as they
can find another counterparty to take on the contract. The period over
which a dealer holds a contract can sometimes be long, especially
177. For discussion on competitive and coordinated monitoring, see Triantis, supra note 51,
at 100-02.
178. See THE G-20 PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, supra note 102 (suggesting that financial
supervision be strengthened).
179. Andras Fulop & Laurence Lescourret, How Liquid is the CDS Market? 4-5 (Dec. 2007)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://perma.ccl4RPL-GP86 (discussing transparency and
trading structure in the CDS market).
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where it is difficult for the dealer to find a client willing to assume the
risk.o80 Where clients do not know who the other is, finding out
relevant details about an underlying debtor and loan contract imposes
impossibly high search costs.
The dealer-dominated nature of the market provides a way
forward in debt governance. 18 ' In other words, dealers themselves can
facilitate the creation of this market by intermediating searches
between lenders and protection sellers with respect to debt
governance. Dealers routinely interact with their clients to collect
information on their trading requirements and preferences, price the
trade in order to connect counterparties, and allow these
counterparties to complete the trade. This centrality to the tradeexecution process makes dealers ideally placed to collect information
on underlying debtors as well as on the terms of the underlying
contract. This information is likely to be of benefit to dealers
themselves. The better the information on underlying debtors and the
terms of the loan, the better the risk assessment the dealer can
perform and the more accurate the pricing is for the CDS contract.
The ability of dealers to connect trading parties is particularly
important in the context of helping CDS traders transact in control
rights. Protection sellers seeking out control rights may not have
transacted directly with a lender. Rather, a protection seller seeking
out control rights may have contracted with another firm that now
seeks protection on the credit insurance it once sold to a lender. The
daisy chains that characterize CDS trading can make it harder for
lenders and protection sellers to find one another in the market. This
is likely to increase reliance on intermediaries that can reduce search
costs between lender and protection seller.
Greater intermediation by dealers also yields informational
gains for regulators. As noted, trade reporting is a critical pillar of
post-Crisis regulation in the CDS market.182 This trade reporting is
designed to create greater transparency in credit derivatives trading,
ultimately helping to mitigate risks for the financial system.183
However, better trade reporting also improves outcomes vis-A-vis
180. Id.
181. See Avellaneda & Cont, supra note 85, at 9-10 (suggesting that the CDS market is
concentrated on a small number of dealers, and that the ten largest dealers account for a
significant portion of gross national trading volume).
182. The Dodd-Frank Act stipulates mandatory trade reporting requirements under
Dodd-Frank Act §§ 731, 766(b). For a critical discussion, see Yadav, supra note 8, at 387, which
argues that moving CDS trading to clearinghouses does not mitigate the risks of their trading.
183. THE G-20 PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, supranote 102.
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underlying debtors. Regulators too might benefit where they can
receive information from dealer-intermediaries regarding the exercise
of debt governance. Where lenders and protection buyers enter into
agreements with respect to control sharing in debt, regulators gain
insights into who has access to control rights vis-A-vis a company and
how these rights are being exercised. This information aids in
understanding risk and, critically, fills in a missing link in current
reform proposals under the Dodd-Frank Act.
Better information also helps regulators to punish lender
indiscipline. Common-law lender-liability regimes are only rarely used
to check misconduct. 184 And the insolvency process may seem remote
from the everyday dealings between borrower and lender. Indeed,
lenders that act with misaligned incentives owing to the play of the
CDS can and have escaped scrutiny. Greater transparency through a
market in debt governance brings regulators more proactively into the
fold to oversee the exercise of creditor control in corporate governance.
By gaining information on CDSs and debt governance, the market
shines a light on who is using control rights and, importantly, on how
they are using them. Lenders that fail to behave cooperatively with
protection sellers-for example, by pushing a borrower into liquidation
to trigger repayment under the CDS-face the prospect of regulatory
scrutiny. These can include those who push borrowers into liquidation
to trigger repayment on the CDS, even where the borrower remains
viable economically. Equally, in a formalized market, protection
sellers that exercise control akin to any lender of record must face
accountability for their actions from regulators and their peers. This
seems straightforward. It ensures that regulation tracks the evolving
notion that the true "lenders" are those who hold the economic risk of
the loan, not simply those who are the legal lenders of record.
B. Checks and Balances
A new market in debt governance offers a cure to the problem
of separating economic risk in corporate debt from the legal control
rights that frame that risk. This market's basic aim is simple: to help
place legal control rights in debt in the hands of those with sufficient
skin in the game to use them effectively. With the importance of
lender rights only likely to grow in the wake of the Financial Crisis,
ensuring the optimality of their exercise constitutes an essential goal
for scholars and lawmakers.

184. Triantis & Daniels, supra note 3, at 1102.
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However, checks and balances are essential. The potential for
abuse is ever present, as it is in any market. Regulators will have to
contend with protection sellers that misuse control levers in debt, to
exercise them speculatively without any real interest in the
underlying borrower. The market also raises some important
questions for future regulation to monitor a market growing in
complexity and innovation.
1. Speculative Trading
Scholars have highlighted the risks that purely speculative
trading in CDSs can present. A high volume of naked swaps can
create problems. For example, as noted earlier, the value of CDS
contracts outstanding can far exceed the face value of the outstanding
debt.' 8a In such cases, CDS protection sellers can end up facing
potentially open-ended liability on swaps, far in excess of the value of
the underlying debt.
Similarly, trading in debt governance can attract opportunistic
traders with no underlying risk in the debtor. This new market can
theoretically allow CDS traders to acquire a set of specific rights in a
loan agreement at much lower cost than acquiring the underlying loan
or an assignment of loan rights. With cheap entry, a market in debt
governance can attract investor activists that use the CDS market for
intervention instead of transacting through the market for managing
underlying credit risk. Additionally, this market can open its doors to
investors with little to lose. These investors enjoy the upside when
they succeed in their intervention. But the cost of this intervention is
likely to be small, insofar as it relates to acquiring select control rights
in the underlying loan agreement. Thus, this market might leave
debtor companies open to opportunistic advances from CDS traders
who are far removed from a company's everyday affairs.
With sophisticated, informed, and repeat traders dominant in
this market, debt governance may be less effective at mitigating risk.
Rather, it may become just a mere tool in the activist's quiver, to be
deployed for extracting private rents-rather than for effectively
managing the governance of underlying debt and reducing risk.
The potential for abuse requires intermediaries to exercise a
gatekeeper function in order to prevent instances of "empty activism."
185. Satyajit Das,

The Credit Default Swap

("CDS") Market-Will It Unravel?,

http://perma.cc/RRY7-62N2 (wilmott.com, archived Mar. 17, 2014) (discussing Delphi Corp,
where Delphi ended up subject to $28 billion worth of CDS outstanding against $5.2 billion
worth of its bonds and loans when it entered bankruptcy).
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Such gatekeeping may require dealers to check whether CDS traders
seeking out control rights actually hold some underlying economic risk
in relation to a debtor. This inquiry is critical. Without a showing that
traders have real skin in the game vis-a-vis a debtor, the market loses
its value as a means of promoting better alignment between economic
risk and corresponding legal rights in debt. Put differently, instead of
these rights being available to net protection sellers, they are deployed
instead by opportunistic activists seeking quick, cheap returns.
Without vigilance as to who can enter the market for governance, the
nexus between rights and risk breaks further. This disconnect makes
it harder for those who wish to exercise substantive creditor control to
succeed in their intervention.
The problem of empty activism might also be addressed by
requiring those purchasing control rights to hold some threshold
amount of risk relative to the outstanding value of the underlying
debt. 86 Specifically, the market could helpfully set a threshold amount
of risk relative to the outstanding value of the underlying debt in
order to enter it. The rationale for a clear threshold relates to the
larger policy goal of assuring engaged lenders rather than
opportunistic ones. With a threshold amount in place, the market can
attract those with a tangible stake in the underlying company. The
threshold should work to prevent intervention by traders who acquire
minimal credit risk on an underlying company in order to cheaply
intervene in that company's affairs. As an added benefit, a threshold
amount should prevent control rights vesting in a large number of
protection sellers. Where protection sellers can acquire small stakes to
intervene, the number of those seeking out control rights can easily
proliferate. With a large number of voices seeking involvement, all
with small stakes in the overall pie, creditor control can become
unsustainable and drained of potency.
2. Adaptive Regulation
The crisis in debt governance has drawn attention to the
significance of debt as a modality of control in corporate life. It has
also shone a light on the lingering inability of regulation to match
innovation in the marketplace. Debt has not generated the same
intensity of regulatory reaction as the market for equities, where
reporting and disclosure requirements are commonplace. 87 Given the
186. The question of what this threshold should be is largely an empirical question and is
outside the scope of this Article.
187. See, e.g., Filing of Schedules 13D and 13G, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (presenting a
statutory example). For a discussion on the subject, see Michelle M. Harner, Distressed Debt
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shareholder-centric focus of corporate law scholarship, this nearexclusive focus on equity rather than debt as the key regulatory unit
of analysis is unsurprising. But it is increasingly unsustainable. The
emergence of CDS trading and its impact on corporate governance
requires a thoroughgoing reworking of existing regulation to control
the economic and social welfare costs that CDSs can extract. A market
for debt governance provides one important solution. But it is only
part of a bigger focus on bringing debt more fully into the light. An
outline of some accompanying suggestions for reform is set out below.
Disclosure. Disclosure constitutes a key pillar of post-Crisis
reform for derivatives markets.188 But reform efforts largely focus on
Wall Street's derivatives traders with scant attention given to the
reference company. This Article brings this underlying corporation
into the analysis as a central subject of scrutiny.
An important first step involves improving the quality of
disclosure on underlying CDS exposures. Bankruptcy laws have made
some progress towards including analysis of CDS positions in
deliberations. Notably, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 2019 requires ad
hoc, unofficial creditor committees to provide a fuller statement of
their economic interests.189 This disclosure helps to uncover empty
creditors. But this Rule is limited to unofficial processes and does not
extend to formal, official creditor committees. A better rule would
require far-reaching disclosure at each stage of insolvency to also
include formal processes within its ambit. Better disclosures of
derivatives positions would help courts analyze in real terms the
stakes lenders' hold and the incentives those alignments generate.
More importantly, a robust disclosure regime would help to identify
which companies are especially susceptible to the costs of empty
creditors from an early stage of distress.
However, disclosure can also be helpful outside of the
distressed debt and bankruptcy context. With the growing significance
of debt governance in corporate life, regularly disclosing CDS
exposures on underlying companies can work to better protect their
economic value.190 CDS traders could provide regulators with fuller
Investing: The New Barbariansat the Gate, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 155, 178-81 (2011) (discussing
the underreporting of debt-based acquisitions and proposing the application of the Williams Act
to debt-based takeovers).
188. THE G-20 PITISBURGH SUMMIT, supra note 102.
189. For summary analysis, see SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, AMENDED BANKRuPTCY RULE
2019 Is EFFECTIVE (2011), available at http://perma.cc/83R-AJLX.
190. Arguably, these disclosures can be incorporated into existing disclosure regimes that
CDS traders must undertake under the Dodd-Frank Act.
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information on their CDS exposures to underlying companies on a
rolling basis, or at least when they acquire large exposures to an
underlying company. This helps regulators track how CDS trading on
corporate debt connects to activity in other markets, such as those for
equities. With regular flows of information, regulators garner insight
into how CDS trading on a company's debt impacts its overall
corporate health. Better data helps regulators connect the dots
between CDS trading and other events in a company's life, such as
mergers, takeovers, asset sell-offs, changes in management, and so on.
With more information on CDS and corporate governance, regulatory
responses can be better tailored to purpose, for example, to prevent
opportunistic protection sellers from using debt governance levers to
promote an agenda of empty activism.' 91
It should come as no surprise that the equities market is
already ahead in advocating a broader, more continual disclosure
regime for equity derivatives. Importantly, section 766(b) of the
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 stipulates that any investor acquiring
beneficial ownership of equity securities through an equity-based
swap must disclose their interest if it exceeds five percent ownership
of a certain class of shares. 192 In this tenor, improving disclosure in
credit derivatives markets follows seamlessly from the recognition of
debt as a, if not the, critical modality of control in corporate
governance. 193
With clarity on the forces shaping corporate life, regulators and
the market internalize the fuller implications of CDS trading in
determinations of corporate value. Interventions may be desirable
where this value is improperly destroyed through opportunistic or
manipulative trading strategies. With a deeper understanding of how
191. For example, a company's over-reliance on leverage and deteriorating creditworthiness
might point regulators to the CDS market for explication. In such cases, regulators could limit
high speculation in its CDS securities.
192. A key issue for equity derivatives has been whether equity swap counterparties-those
who protect shareholders against downside risk of their investment-should disclose their
interest as part of section 13(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act 1934 and schedule 13(d)
disclosures. This issue has been litigated already. See generally CSX Corp. v. Children's
Investment Fund Management (UK) LLP, 654 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2011), which left unclear the
issue of whether or not equity swap counterparties protecting shareholders should disclose their
interest. Section 766(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act 2010 seeks to provide greater clarity in this
regard. It stipulates that any investor that acquires beneficial ownership of equity securities
through an equity-based swap must disclose their interest if it exceeds five percent ownership of
a certain class of shares. The new sections 766(e) of the Dodd-Frank Act and 13(o) of the
Exchange Act direct the SEC to define beneficial ownership.
193. See also Harner, supra note 187, at 155 (suggesting that there is a growing use of debt,
rather than equity to cause a change of control at target companies); Hu & Black, Empty Voting
II, supra note 1, at 632 (providing an overview of decoupling).
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CDS trading impacts an underlying company, regulation can be
tailored to optimize the positive externalities of CDS trading. Without
means to track transactional connections between Wall Street and
Main Street, the fuller impact of derivatives trading will only half
explored.
Lender liability. Even with disclosure, further corrective tools
are necessary to check conflicts of interest and value-destroying
interventions through the CDS market. A first step is to (i) include
protection sellers explicitly within existing lender liability regimes,
and (ii) discipline them for deleterious conduct through bankruptcy
processes.
Protection sellers should generally be motivated to act in the
best interests of the underlying debtor because protection sellers have
an economic interest in the debtor's continuing economic vitality.
However, as outlined above, the market for debt governance may
introduce the problem of "empty activism," which arises because CDS
traders might also have incentives to trade in debt governance even
where they have no economic interest at stake. In cases of empty
activism, CDS traders cannot always be counted on to act in the
underlying debtor's best interests: they may aim, instead, to derive
rents from arbitrage between markets, or to be disruptive with respect
to the underlying debtor. One adaptive regulatory response to this
empty activist problem would be to extend lender liability to those
acquiring debt's levers of control.194 Where CDS traders are main
movers in proposing action or advice regarding an underlying debtor's
governance, an expansive and functional definition of "lender"
constrains conduct and introduces liability costs that limit the payoff.
Even where CDS traders have real economic risk on underlying debt,
a wider lens in terms of liability motivates better behavior. With
liability risks, CDS traders seeking out control levers in debt must
internalize the costs of their harmful behavior. This is not to suggest
that lender liability be made stricter, or that the threshold for
imposing liability be lowered to account for protection sellers. It
simply proposes that those standards that apply to legal lenders of
record be extended to also apply to economic lenders intervening
improperly in debtor affairs.
The suggestion that the problem of disruptive CDS traders can
be mitigated by a broader construction of lender liability is consistent
194. See In re Fabricators, Inc., 926 F.2d 1458, 1470 (5th Cir. 1991) (subjecting a lender to
liability that advised management to favor this lender's private interests and undermine those of
competing creditors).
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with scholars who advocate that rent-seeking behavior is best
controlled by taking a functional view of corporate influence. These
scholars argue for flexibility when determining who, beyond
managers, holds power within an organization. Professors Anabtawi
and Stout, for example, propose the creation of fiduciary duties for
institutional investors to ensure they exercise their authority in a
responsible manner.195 Within this normative trend, a broader
construction of lender liability to also include protection sellers
matches market innovation and design. Imposing liability risk poses
its own challenges through costs that dissuade legitimate protection
sellers from acting to repair the broken nexus between risk and its
management mechanisms. However, the principle is clear. If an actor
behaves like a lender, constraints ordinarily applicable to lenders
should be applied widely, through a functional lens, rather than one
reflecting formalist, and increasingly outmoded, conceptions of what a
"lender" looks like.
Debt discipline in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy law has developed
its own procedures for recouping value lost through opportunistic and
reckless conduct by debtors and lenders alike. Voidable preference
rules and limits on transactions at undervalue constitute just one such
mechanism that allows the debtor's estate to retrieve value. 196
As noted earlier, greater disclosure of CDS positions is
emerging in the bankruptcy process, beginning with Rule 2019.
However, this incremental move towards revealing derivatives
positions in bankruptcy, and with this the motivations that
undergirds lender conduct, is just part of the picture. The deeper
workings of bankruptcy-regarding the optimal allocation of capital to
match the risks and losses created by the various actors involved-can
helpfully extend to cover the conduct of CDS traders. In other words,
bankruptcy laws could make protection sellers subject to traditional
rules on voidable preferences and transactions at an undervalue. This
would answer a separate question from liability for lender behavior.
Even where the activities of lenders do not reach the level necessary to
generate lender liability, interventions by protection sellers can still
reduce the value of the debtor's estate.197 Normatively, this move
broadens the frame of regulatory vision to encompass those who

195. Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1255, 1256 (2008).
196. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2012) (providing statutory definitions).
197. Id. § 547(b)(4)(A) (outlining the ninety-day look-back period for voiding preference
transactions).
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exercise influence on a functional basis alongside those who remain
formally vested with the legal rights in debt governance.
In summary, the empty creditor problem has emerged as a
significant impediment to the effective exercise of creditor discipline.
This Article takes steps towards offering a solution to this problem: a
market in debt governance that helps those holding economic risk to
also be able to acquire control rights in debt. In light of the value that
is being lost through the operation of empty creditors, this solution is
necessary-and possible. This Article outlines the incentives that can
bring lenders and protection sellers together to exercise sounder
governance through debt. Certainly, like all markets, there exists the
potential for abuse on the part of CDS traders. However, the solution
proposed in this Article moves the debate forward to overcome the
negative influence of empty creditors in debt governance and to reduce
the risks they create for financial stability. Recognizing that the CDS
market is here to stay, a market in debt governance ensures that a
central influence in corporate life-lender oversight and disciplinecan work effectively to its fullest potential.
VI. CONCLUSION

This Article has drawn attention to the considerable complexity
inhering in the CDS-and our incomplete understanding of their
power vis-a-vis the borrower-lender relationship. It has argued that
credit derivatives have given rise to a revolution in debt governance.
Established theory has assumed that this revolution is one sided.
Conventionally construed, CDSs must extract a heavy price from the
corporate sector. But this Article argues otherwise. It demonstrates
that the incentives underpinning the conduct of CDS traders are
complex and multifaceted, which, when properly harnessed, can
encourage rather than erase debt governance. This Article has
proposed the creation of a market in creditor control to provide CDS
traders a formal market in which to trade the control rights in
underlying debt. With this market in place, economic risk and legal
control in debt can better align. Certainly, the Article is just the first
step, and it raises several enquiries for further study. But in its
discussion, this Article has drawn attention to the law's failure to fully
appreciate the interconnected reality of the CDS market. What has
become clear, however, is that only a broader regulatory field of vision
can best encompass both the reality of today's interconnected markets
and the depth of their interactions with the corporate sector. How
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broad is broad enough, of course, remains an open question in the age
of innovation.
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